U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Technical Information Service

AD-A035 848

DIGITAL ENCODING FOR SECURE DATA COMMUNICATIONS

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California

SEPTEMBER 1976

:...



| REPORT DOCUMENTATION | PAGE | READ INSTRUCTIONS |
|--|---|--|
| REPORT NUMBER | 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. | 3. REC:PIENT'S CATALOG NUMBEP |
| | | |
| TITLE (and Sublitio) | | S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVER |
| Digital Encoding for Sec | ure Data | Engineer's Thesis; |
| Communications | | September 1976 |
| | | · PERFORMING ONG. REPORT NUMBER |
| AUTHOR(.) | | 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*) |
| Eduardo Emilio Coquis Ro | ndón | |
| PERFORMING ORGAN'ZATION NAME AND ADDRES | s | 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TAS |
| Naval Postgraduate Schoo | 1 | AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS |
| Monterey, California 93 | 940 | |
| CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS | | 12. REPORT DATE |
| Naval Postgraduate Schoo | 1 | September 1976 |
| Monterey, California 93 | 940 | 13. NUMBER OF PAGES |
| MANITADING ACENCY MAME & ADDRESS // Alle | | |
| | | Inclassified |
| | | UNCIASSITICA |
| | | 154. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADIN SCHEDULE |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aids if necessary a | ase; distribut In Block 20, 'I different fre in Block 20, 'I different fre | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary a Digital Encoding | ase; distribut t in Block 20, 't different fre | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse alde II necessary a Digital Encoding Cryptography | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary a Digital Encoding Cryptography pseudo-random cipher data-keyed cipher | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary a Digital Encoding Cryptography pseudo-random cipher data-keyed cipher | ase; distribut In Block 20, 'I different fre rd identify by block number) rd identify by block number) | ion unlimited. |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstreet entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aids if necessary of Digital Encoding Cryptography pseudo-random cipher data-keyed cipher ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aids if necessary of This thesis is conce | ase; distribut t in Block 20, 't different fre nd identify by block number) rd identify by block number) | use of the digital |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstreet entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary a Digital Encoding Cryptography pseudo-random Cipher data-keyed cipher ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary a This thesis is conce computer to realize cryp | ase; distribut | ion unlimited. • Report) use of the digital ree cryptographic |
| DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public rele DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebstreet entered SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aids if necessary of Digital Encoding Cryptography pseudo-random cipher data-keyed cipher ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse aids if necessary of This thesis is conce computer to realize cryp systems: simple substit | ase; distribut In Block 20, 'I different fre in block 20, 'I different fre id identify by block number) erned with the otography. Thr sution, pseudo- | ion unlimited. |

∢

ĩ

ř

100

all and a second

1 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Then Date Entered)

a second with a star as a start which there is

÷

N. N.

.

. 1 > -

3

÷

5

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Dete Entered

(20. ABSTRACT Continued)

designee, implemented through computer programming, and evaluated. A suitable cyclic error correcting code is designed to encode these systems for transmission. The code is tested by simulating a noisy channel.

د بعدد ويوني

ADDESSION ATIS CTO Digital Encoding for Secure Data Communications

by

1

Eduardo Emilio Coquis Rondón Lieutenant, Peruvian Navy B.S., Naval Postgraduate School, 1974 M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, 1975

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

ELECTRICAL ENGINEER

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1976

ρЩ Author Approved by: Thesis Advisor Second Reader nard E. Kirk Chairman, Department of Electrical Engineering Systan . Academic Dean

ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the use of the digital computer to realize cryptography. Three cryptographic systems: simple substitution, pseudo-random cipher (polyalphabetic cipher), and data-keyed cipher, are designed, implemented through computer programming, and evaluated. A suitable cyclic error correcting code is designed to encode these systems for transmission. The code is tested by simulating a noisy channel.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| I. | DEFINITIONS | 10 |
|------|---|----|
| II. | INTRODUCTION | 12 |
| III. | HISTORICAL BACKGROUND | 14 |
| IV. | THEORY OF SECRECY SYSTEMS | 20 |
| | A. INTRODUCTION | 20 |
| | B. EVALUATION OF SECRECY SYSTEMS | 20 |
| | C. PERFECT SECRECY | 21 |
| | D. EQUIVOCATION | 26 |
| | E. IDEAL SECRECY SYSTEMS | 27 |
| v. | DIGITAL SUBSTITUTION | 30 |
| | A. THE DECWRITER SYSTEM | 30 |
| | B. APPLICATION OF GROUP THEORY TO CRYPTOGRAFHY | 33 |
| | C. TRANSFORMATIONS | 36 |
| | D. SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION | 40 |
| | E. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RESULTS | 41 |
| | F. PSEUDORANDOM SUBSTITUTION | 46 |
| VI. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER | 64 |
| | A. INTRODUCTION | 64 |
| | B. DESCRIPTION AND REALIZATION | 64 |
| | C. TEST PROCEDURE | 67 |
| | D. RESULTS | 71 |
| | E. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATION | 73 |
| VII. | ERROR CORRECTING CODE SCHEME | 87 |
| | A. BEST CODE DETERMINATION | 88 |

| COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION 91 |
|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Selection of Polynomial 91 |
| 2. Computer Realization of Encoder 94 |
| 3. Minimum Distance Decoder 95 |
| C. NOISY CHANNEL SIMULATION 95 |
| VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS101 |
| APPENDIX A103 |
| APPENDIX B108 |
| APPENDIX C109 |
| APPENDIX D110 |
| APPENDIX E117 |
| APPENDIX F118 |
| APPENDIX G120 |
| LIST OF REFERENCES122 |
| INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST124 |

LIST OF FIGURES

-

1

| 1. | A SECRECY SYSTEM21 |
|-----|--|
| 2. | BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER 42 |
| 3. | SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER-ENCRYPTING EXAMPLE43 |
| 4. | PLAINTEXT ENGLISH LANGUAGE-DISTRIBUTION PLOT47 |
| 5. | PLAINTEXT ITALIAN LANGUAGE-DISTRIBUTION PLOT48 |
| 6. | PLAINTEXT SPANISH LANGUAGE-DISTRIBUTION PLOT49 |
| 7. | PLAINTEXT FRENCH LANGUAGE-DISTRIBUTION PLOT50 |
| 8. | SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=A51 |
| 9. | SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=C52 |
| 10. | SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=G53 |
| 11. | PSEUDORANDOM CIPHER-BLOCK DIAGRAM56 |
| 12. | PSEUDORANDOM CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=C60 |
| 13. | PSEUDORANDOM CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=K61 |
| 14. | PSEUDORANDOM CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT- 7 ALPHABETS -62 |
| 15. | PSEUDORANDOM CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-23 ALPHABETS -63 |
| 16. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-CONCEPT66 |
| 17. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-REALIZATION68 |
| 18. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-BLOCK DIAGRAM69 |
| 19. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-ENCRYPTING PROCESS EXAMPLE74 |
| 20. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-ENCRYPTING PROCESS EXAMPLE75 |
| 21. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-EXAMPLE OF TRANSIENT SUBSTITUTION82 |
| 22. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=A, i=783 |
| 23. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=C.i=784 |

| 24. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY=J, i=2 | 85 |
|-----|--|----|
| 25. | THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER-DISTRIBUTION PLOT-KEY-J, i=17 | 86 |
| 26. | THE 4-STAGE ENCODER OF THE CHARACTERISTIC POLYNOMIAL $G(X) = x^4 + x + 1$ | 93 |
| 27. | SECURE DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM | 98 |

LIST OF TABLES

| I. | USASCII-68 CHARACTER CODE | 31 |
|-------|--|----|
| II. | DECWRITER PRINTING CHARACTERS AND THEIR BINARY REPRESENTATION | 32 |
| III. | INTERMEDIATE KEY VALUES | 39 |
| IV. | FREQUENCY OF THE LETTERS OF THE ENGLISH ALPHABET, ARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY AND BY FREQUENCY | 44 |
| v. | SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER-TABLE OF OCCURRENCES | 54 |
| VI. | DATA-KEYED CIPHER-TABLE OF OCCURRENCES | 76 |
| VII. | DATA-KEYED CIPHER-TABLE OF OCCURRENCES | 77 |
| VIII. | TABLE OF MESSAGE WORDS AND THEIR CORRES- PONDENT CODE WORD FOR THE (15,4) CYCLIC CODE | 96 |
| IX. | P(e) VS. CHANNEL β FOR THE (15,4) CODE | 97 |

I. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are given to acquaint the reader with some of the terms commonly encountered in the field of cryptography.

<u>Cryptology</u> is the branch of knowledge that deals with the development and use of all forms of secret communication.

<u>Cryptography</u> is the branch of cryptology that deals with secret writing.

<u>Cryptanlaysis</u> is the branch of cryptology that deals with the analysis and solution of cryptographic systems.

A <u>Cipher</u> is a cryptographic system which conceals, in a cryptographic sense, the letters or groups of letters in the message or <u>plaintext</u>.

Enciphering is the operation of concealing a plaintext, and the result is a cipher text, or in general a cryptogram.

<u>Deciphering</u> is the process of discovering the secret meaning of a cipher text.

A key is the variable parameter of a cipher system, prearranged between correspondents, which determines the specific application of a general cipher system being used. The use of keys permits almost endless variations within a given cipher system. In fact, the value of a specific cipher system is based on how hard it is for an "enemy" to break a cryptogram or series of cryptograms, assuming he knows the complete details of the system but

lacks the keys which were used to encipher the cryptograms $originall_{y'}$.

A <u>code</u> is a cryptographic system which substitutes symbol groups for words, phrases, or sentences found in the plaintext. It involves the use of a codebook, copies of which are kept by each correspondent.

Encoding is the operation of concealing a message using a code.

Decoding is the process of recovering an encoded message.

A code differs from a cipher because a code deals with plaintext in variable size units, such as words or phrases, while a cipher deals with plaintext in fixed size units, usually a letter at a time.

II. INTRODUCTION

Since there is no way of making data communication links physically secure, particularly if some form of radio transmission is involved, encryption is the only practical method of protecting the transmitted data. In the commercial world and nonmilitary parts of government, there is a growing need for encryption. This need for encryption is not just to satisfy the legal requirements for privacy, but also to protect systems from criminal activities.

At the present time, communication systems seem to be going towards digital means. There are already in use digital systems for data communications as well as for public services such as the telephone system.

The present work was intended to study the possibility of using a digital computer to realize cryptographic systems. Further, this computer can be envisioned as part of a digital communication system, mainly to do cryptography and to implement suitable error correcting codes. The DEC PDP-11/40 minicomputer was used to do this study.

Through this work, three cryptographic systems were designed, ranging from a simple substitution cipher to a data-keyed cipher. On the latter the message itself constituted the key to modify other characters. Very significant results were obtained from it in the sense that it gives rise to a text where its characters were nearly

equiprobable. Further, a cyclic error correcting code was designed and implemented to work with these cryptographic systems.

~~~~~~

#### III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

「「「「「「「「」」」」」」「「「「」」」」」」」」」」」」

Some of the earliest practical crytographic systems were the monoalphabetic substitution systems used by the Romans [Ref. 1]. In these, one letter is substituted for another. For example, an A might be replaced by a C. By the fifteenth century, an Italian by the name of Alberti came up with a technique of cryptoanalyzing letters by frequency analyses. As a result, he invented probably the first polyalphabetic substitution system using a cipher disk. Thus, he would rotate the disk and encode several more words with the next substitution alphabet.

Early in the sixteenth century Trithemius, a Benedictine Monk, had the first printed book published on cryptology. Trithemius described the square table or tableau which was the first known instance of a progressive key applied to polyalphabetic substitution. It provided a means of changing alphabets with each character. Later in the sixteenth century, Vigenere perfected the autokey; a progressive key in which the last decoded character led to the next substitution alphabet in a polyalphabetic key. These were basically the techniques that were widely applied in the cryptomachines in the first half of the twentieth century. Various transposition techniques have been employed including the wide use of changing word order and techniques such as rail transpositions (used in the Civil War).

In 1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs, a man born in Holland but a naturalized Frenchman, published a book entitled <u>La</u> <u>Cryptographic Militaire</u>. In it, he established two general principles for cryptographic systems. They were:

 A key must withstand the operational strains of heavy traffic. It must be assumed that the enemy has the general system. Therefore, the security of the system must rest with the key.

and a second second second second and a second s

2. Only cryptoanalysts can know the security of the key. In this, he infers that anyone who proposes a cryptographic technique should be familiar with the techniques that could be used to break it.

From these two general principles, six specific requirements emerged in his book:

- The key should be, if not theoretically unbreakable, at least unbreakable in practice.
- Compromise of the nardware system or coding technique should not result in compromising the security of communications that the system carries.
- The key should be remembered without notes and should be easily changeable.
- 4. The cryptograms must be transmittable by telegraph. Today this would be expanded to include both digital intelligence and voice (if voice scramblers are employed) utilizing either wire or radio as the medium.

- 5. The apparatus or documents should be portable and operable by a single person.
- The system should be easy, neither requiring knowledge of a long list of rules nor involving mental strain.

In 1917 Gilbert S. Vernam, a young engineer at American Telephone and Telegraph Company, using the Baudot code (teletype) invented a means of adding two characters (exclusive or). Vernam's machine mixed a key with text as illustrated by the following:

| Clear Text      | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Key             | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Coded Character | 1 | 1 | 1 | Ū | 1 |

To derive the text from the coded character, all that was required was the addition of the key again to the coded character.

| Coded Character | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Кеу             | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Clear Text      | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

His machines used a key tape loop about eight feet long which caused the key to repeat itself over a high volume of traffic. This allowed cryptoanalysts to derive the key. William F. Friedman, in fact, solved cryptograms using single-loop code tapes but appears to have been

unsuccessful when two code tapes were used. Major Joseph Om Mauborgne (U.S. Army) then introduced the one-time code tape derived from a random noise source. This was one of the first theoretically (and in practice) unbreakable code systems. The major disadvantage of the system was the enormous amounts of key required for high-volume traffic.

During the 1920's and 1930's, the rotor-code machines having five and more rotors, each rotor representing a scrambling step, were developed. They proved relatively insecure, requiring only high-traffic volume for the cryptoanalyst to break them. In fact, the Japanese used a code-wheel-type machine for their diplomatic communications well into World War fI. It was vulnerable to cryptoanalysis, and William F. Friedman and his group not only solved the code but reconstructed a model of the machine to break Japanese diplomatic correspondence. Thus, President Roosevelt and others were aware of the impending break in diplomatic relations with Japan just prior to World War II.

The code wheels (or rotors) were nothing more than key memories storing quantities of key which could easily be changed by interchanging rotor positions, specifying various start points for each rotor, and periodicaly replacing a set of rotors. This provided a means of producing what is called key leverage.

The advent of electronic enciphering systems substantially replaced the mechanical cryptographic machines. And, further the appearance and fast development of digital logic is offering new tools to modern crypto designers. References (2), (3) and (4) from the Bell System Technical Journal provide interesting literature on Digital Data Scramblers,

Today, the most commonly encountered commercial cryptosystem is based on the "shift register," [Ref. 5]. Despite design variations, shift registers are used as pseudorandom key generators. The implementation of data scramblers with pseudorandom sequences using logic circuits is suggested by Twigg [Ref. 6], and Henrickson [Ref. 7]. The idea of shift register sequences is well treated by Golomb [Ref. 8]. The relative weakness of pseudorandom codes is pointed by Meyer and Tuchman [Ref. 9], from I.B.M. For high security, Torrieri [Ref. 10], and Geffe [Ref. 11], introduce the idea of using nonlinear as well as linear operations. The theory of nonlinear operations is also contained in Ref. 8.

Finally, the appearance of modern high speed digital computers has risen speculation as how best to apply its capabilities since it is available for both cryptography and cryptanalysis. Even the newest microprocessors are reported [Ref. 12], as being designed for encription devices.

A very comprehensive historical exposition with some descriptive technical content is the book by Kahn, The

<u>Codebreakers</u> [Ref. 13], which appeared in 1967. Of special interests are the sections devoted to the cryptographic agencies of the major powers, including the United States.

For the interested reader in the field of cryptography, the American Cryptogram Association publishes "The Cryptogram," a bimonthly magazine of articles and cryptograms. The hobby of solving cryptograms provides a fascinating intellectual challenge. Patient analysis and flashes of insight, combined with the enthusiasm of uncovering something hidden, give cryptanalysts an enjoyment which is almost unique.

#### IV. THEORY OF SECRECY SYSTEMS

#### A. INTRODUCTION

A secrecy system is defined as a set of transformations of one space (the set of possible messages) into a second space (the set of possible cryptograms). Each particular transformation of the set corresponds to enciphering with a particular key. The transformations are supposed reversible (non-singular) in order to obtain unique deciphering when the key is known together with the specific system used.

Each key and therefore each transformation is assumed to have an a priori probability associated with it. Similarly each possible message is assumed to have an associated a priori probability of being selected for encryption. These two represent the a priori knowledge of the situation for a cryptoanalyst trying to break the cipher.

To use the system a key is first selected and sent to the receiving point. The choice of a key determines a particular transformation in the set forming the system. Then a message is selected and the particular transformation corresponding to the selected key is applied to the message to produce a cryptogram. This cryptogram is transmitted to the receiving point by a channel where it can be intercepted by an undesired agent. At the receiving end, the inverse of the particular transformation is applied to the cryptogram

to recover the original message. Figure 1 provides the conceptual idea of a secrecy system.



Figure 1. A Secrecy System.

If the referred undesired agent intercepts the transmitted cryptogram through a channel, he can calculate from it and from his possibel knowledge of the system being used, the a posteriori probabilities of the various possible messages and keys which might have produced this cryptogram. This set of a posteriori probabilities constitutes his knowledge of the key and message after the interception.

The calculation of the a posteriori probabilities is the generalized problem in cryptanalysis.

C. PERFECT SECRECY

Shannon [Ref. 14], provides for concepts such as entropy, redundancy, equivocation and many others that are helpful for evaluating secrecy systems.

Let us assume that the message space is constituted by a finite number of messages  $P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n$  with an associated a priori probabilities  $p(P_1), p(P_2), \ldots, p(P_n)$ and that these messages are mapped into the cryptogram space by the transformation

 $C_j = T_i P_j$ 

The cryptanalyst intercepts a particular  $C_j$  and can then calculate the a posteriori conditional probability for the various messages,  $p(P_j/C_j)$ . It seems natural now to define that one condition for perfect secrecy is that for all  $C_j$ , the a posteriori probabilities of the messages P given that  $C_j$  has been received, are equal to their a priori probabilities, independent of these values. Or, from an information theory viewpoint, intercepting the cryptogram has given the cryptanalyst no information about the message; he just knows that a message was sent. On the other hand, if this condition is not satisfied there will exist situations in which the cryptanalyst has certain

a priori probabilities and certain choices of key and message thus preventing perfect secrecy to be achieved.

Shannon [Ref. 15], gives a theorem stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect secrecy, namely

p(C/P) = p(C)

for all the messages (P) and all the cryptograms (C). Where

- p(C/P) = Conditional probability of cryptogram C to occur if message P is chosen. p(C) = Probability of obtaining cryptogram
- p(C) = Probability of obtaining cryptogram C for any cause.

Stated in other terms, the total probability of all keys that transform  $P_i$  into a given cryptogram C is equal to that of all keys transforming  $P_j$  into the same C, for all  $P_i$ ,  $P_j$  and C.

In the <u>Mathematical Theory of Communications</u> given by Reference 14, it was shown that a convenient measure of information was the entropy. For a set of events with probabilities  $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n$ , the entropy H is given by:

$$H = -\sum_{n} p_{i} \log p_{i}$$

In a secrecy system there are two choices involved, that of the message and that of the key. We may measure the amount of information produced when a message is chosen by

 $H(P) = -\Sigma p(P) \log p(P)$ 

the summation being over all possible messages. Similarly, there is an uncertainty associated with the choice of key given by

 $H(K) = -\Sigma p(K) \log p(K)$ 

For perfect secrecy systems the amount of information in the message is at most log n (occurring when all messages are equiprobable). This information can be concealed completely only if the key uncertainty is at least log n. In a more general way of expressing this: There is a limit to what we can achieve with a given uncertainty in key, the amount of uncertainty we can introduce into the solution cannot be greater than the key uncertainty.

The situation gets more complicated if the number of messages is infinite. For example, assume that messages are generated as infinite sequences of letters by a suitable Markoff process. From the definition, no finite key will give perfect secrecy. We can suppose then, that the key source generates keys in the same manner, that is as an

infinite sequence of symbols. Suppose further that only a certain length  $L_k$  is needed to encipher and decipher a length  $L_p$  of message. Let the logarithm of the number of letters in the message alphabet be  $R_p$  and that for the key alphabet be  $R_k$ . Then from the finite case, it is evident that perfect secrecy requires

 $R_p L_p \leq R_k L_k$ 

This type of perfect secrecy is obtained by the Vernam system [Ref. 16].

Thus, it can be concluded that the key required for perfect secrecy depends on the total number of possible messages. The disadvantage of perfect systems for large correspondence systems such as for data communications and data retrieval services, is the equivalent amount of key that must be sent.

In this paper the requirement for a large key for large messages is eliminated by designing a self keyed system that will continually originate key letters based on several past letters that were already ciphered. Provided enough distance is chosen in between selected letters the system will avoid the statistical dependency of consecutive letters in a natural language, thus generating a sequence of key letters suitable for any message length.

#### D. EQUIVOCATION

and a second state of the state of the second state of the second state of the second state of the second state

A cryptographic system can be compared with a communication system in the sense that whereas in one the signal is unintentionally perturbed by noise, and in the other, namely the cryptographic system, the message is intentionally perturbed by the ciphering process to hide the information. Thus, there is an uncertainty of what was actually transmitted. From information theory a natural mathematical measure of uncertainty is the conditional entropy of the transmitted signal when the received signal is known. This conditional entropy is known as equivocation.

 $H(X/Y) = -\Sigma p(x,y) \log p(x/y)$ 

From the point of view of the cryptanalyst, a secrecy system is almost identical with a noisy communication system. The message is operated by a statistical element, the enciphering system, with its statistically chosen key. The result of this operation is the cryptogram, which when transmit+ed is vulnerable to interception and available for analysis. The main differences in the two cases are:

 The operation of the enciphering transformation is generally of a more complex nature than the perturbing noise in a channel.

2. The key for a secrecy system is usually chosen from a finite set of possibilities while the noise in the

channel is more often continually introduced, in effect chosen from an infinite set.

With these considerations in mind it is natural to use the equivocation as a theoretical secrecy index. It may be noted that there are two significant equivocations, that of the key and that of the message which are denoted as H(K/C) and H(P/C):

 $H(K/C) = -\Sigma p(C,K) \log p(K/C)$  $H(P/C) = -\Sigma p(C,P) \log p(K/P)$ 

The same general arguments used to justify the equivocation as a measure of uncertainty in communication theory apply here as well. Zero equivocation requires that one message (or key) have unit probability and all others zero, corresponding to complete knowledge.

#### E. IDEAL SECRECY SYSTEMS

the starte and the second of the starter and the starter between the starter of the

In Reference 15, the concept of equivocation leads to means of evaluating secrecy systems as a function of the amount of N, the number of letters received. It is shown that for most systems as N increases the referred equivocations tend to decrease to zero, consequently the solution of the cryptogram becomes unique at a point called unicity point.

In the section on Perfect Secrecy it was stated that perfect secrecy requires an infinite amount of key if

messages of unlimited length are allowed. With a finite key size, the equivocation of key and message generally approaches zero. The other extreme is for H(K/C) to be equal to H(K). Then, no matter how much material is intercepted, there is not a unique solution but many of comparable probability. An ideal system can be defined as one in which H(K/C) and H(P/C) do not approach zero as N increases. A strongly ideal system would be one in which H(K/C) remains constant at H(K), that is, knowing the cryptogram has not aided in solving the key uncertainty.

An example of an ideal cipher is a simple substitution in an artificial language in which all letters are equiprobable and successive letters independently chosen.

With natural languages it is in general possible to approximate the ideal characteristic. The complexity of the system needed usually goes up rapidly when an attempt is made to realize this. To approximate the ideal equivocation, one may first operate on the message with a transducer which removes all redundancies. After this almost any simple ciphering system - substitution, transposition, etc., is satisfactory. The more elaborate the transducer and the nearer the output is to the desired form, the more closely will the secrecy system approximate the ideal characteristic.

The work to be presented in following sections, will describe a scheme to approximate the ideal secrecy system by using a digital computer to mainly accomplish two things:

1. Change the probability structure of natural languages to obtain an almost equiprobable occurrence of letters.

2. Eliminate the statistical dependence of successive letters in natural languages.

وتتكري وتكمده

Further, a message transformed to reflect these properties, will be either transmitted as such or an additional conventional ciphering can be made.

#### V. DIGITAL SUBSTITUTION

The development of a digital substitution cipher was the first step taken to accomplish the present work. After it, more complex variations were experimented to obtain a reasonable secure system taking advantage of the use of the computer. Thus, it can be said that most of the subsequent work rests on these first results. A brief explanation follows of the Decwriter system and its character codes used to interface with the PDP-11/40 computer.

#### A. THE DECWRITER SYSTEM

The LC11 Decwriter system is a high-speed teletypewriter designed to interface with the PDP-11 family of processors to provide both: Input (keyboard) and cutput (printer) functions for the system. It can be used as the console input/output device. The system can receive characters from the keyboard or can print at speeds up to 30 characters per second in standard ASCII formats. The character code used is USASCII-68 which is listed in Table No. I. From these 128 characters, only 64 are printing characters, those of columns 2, 3, 4 and 5. Table No. II presents these 64 characters and their correspondent binary representation.

|     | COLUMN           | 0      | 1    | 2   | 3    | 4   | 5   | 6      | 7    |
|-----|------------------|--------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|--------|------|
| ROW | BITS<br>4321 765 | > :000 | .001 | 010 | 1011 | 100 | 101 | 1110 . | 1111 |
| 0   | 0000             | NUL    | DLE  | SP  | 0    | 0   | Р   | `      | р    |
| 1   | 0001             | SOH    | DCI  | !   | 1    | A   | Q   | a      | Ą    |
| 2   | 0010             | STX    | DC2  | 37  | 2    | B   | R   | þ      | r    |
| 3   | 0011             | ETX    | DC3  | #   | 3    | С   | S   | с      | s    |
| 4   | 0100             | EOT    | DC4  | S   | 4    | D   | T   | d      | t    |
| 5   | 0101             | ENQ    | NAK  | %   | 5    | E   | U   | e      | u    |
| 6   | 0110             | АСК    | SYN  | &   | 6    | F   | v   | f      | v    |
| 7   | 0111             | BEL    | ETB  | ,   | 7    | G   | W   | g      | w    |
| 8   | 1000             | BS     | CAN  | (   | 8    | н   | x   | h      | x    |
| 9   | 1001             | HT     | EM   | )   | 9    | I   | Y   | i      | у    |
| 10  | 1010             | LF     | SUB  | *   | :    | J   | Z   | j      | Z    |
| 11  | 1011             | VT     | ESC  | +   | ;    | K   | [   | k      | {    |
| 12  | 1100             | FF     | FS   | ,   | <    | L   | Λ   | 1      | ł    |
| 13  | 1101             | CR     | GS   | -   | =    | М   | }   | m      | }    |
| 14  | 1110             | SO     | RS   | •   | >.   | N   |     | n      | ~    |
| 15  | 1111             | SI     | US   | 1   | ?    | 0   |     | 0      | DEL  |

TABLE I - USASCII-68 CHARACTER CODE

| SP | 10100000 | 0 | 10110000 | Q | 11000000 | Р | 11010000              |
|----|----------|---|----------|---|----------|---|-----------------------|
| !  | 10100001 | 1 | 10110001 | A | 11000001 | Q | 11010001              |
| 11 | 10100010 | 2 | 10110010 | В | 11000010 | R | 11010010              |
| ŧ  | 10100011 | 3 | 10110011 | С | 11000011 | S | 11010011              |
| \$ | 10100100 | 4 | 10110100 | D | 11000100 | T | 11010100              |
| ક  | 10100101 | 5 | 10110101 | E | 11000101 | U | 11010101              |
| હ  | 10100110 | 6 | 10110110 | F | 11000110 | v | 11010110              |
| T  | 10100111 | 7 | 10110111 | G | 11000111 | W | 11010111              |
| (  | 10101000 | 8 | 10111000 | Н | 11001000 | х | 11010000              |
| )  | 10101001 | 9 | 10111001 | I | 11001001 | Y | 11011001              |
| *  | 10101010 | : | 10111010 | J | 11001010 | Z | 11011010              |
| ÷  | 10101011 | ; | 10111011 | K | 11001011 | ٢ | 11011011              |
| ,  | 10101100 | < | 10111100 | L | 11001100 | ļ | 11011100              |
| -  | 10101101 | = | 10111101 | М | 11001101 | ] | 110 <sub>1</sub> 1101 |
| •  | 10101110 | > | 10111110 | Ν | 11001110 | ^ | 11011110              |
| ,  | 10101111 | ? | 10111111 | 0 | 11001111 |   | 11011111              |

۰.

ť

# TABLE II ~ DECWRITER PRINTING CHARACTERS AND THEIR BINARY REPRESENTATION

B. APPLICATION OF GROUP THEORY TO CRYPTOGRAPHY

A group is defined as a set of elements a, b, c, ... and an operation, denoted by + for which the following properties are satisfied:

a) For any elements a,b, in the set, a + b is in the set.

b) The associative law is satisfied; that is, for any a,b,c in the set

$$a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$$

c) There is an identity element, I, in the set such that

a + I = I + a = a; all a in the set.

d) For each element a, there is an inverse a<sup>-1</sup> in the set satisfying

$$a + a^{-1} = a^{-1} + a = I$$

A group is abelian or commutative if

a + b = b + a for all a and b in the set.

The integers under ordinary addition and the set of binary sequences of a fixed length n under exclusive-or operation are examples of abelian groups. From boolean algebra, an additional property of an abelian group of binary sequences of a fixed length n under the exclusive-or operation is that,

```
given a + b = c
then a + c = b
and b + c = a; for all a, b and c in
the group.
```

The 8-bit binary sequences with which the computer handles the ASCII code characters is in this sense an abelian group. This last property suggested the idea of encrypting simply by exclusive-oring the desired set of sequences by a key (another sequence or a set of sequences). Decrypting or recovery of the original sequences can be done simply by exclusive-oring the obtained set of sequences with the key.

Basically the transformation can be expressed as

C = K + P, for encryption, and P = K + C, for decryption,

where C, K and P represent an 8-bit sequence stored in a register and the symbol + stands for the logical exclusiveor operation.

While it is clear that the whole 2<sup>8</sup> 8-bit sequences can be used to represent crypto sequences, since this set
of sequences constitute an abelian group; a limitation was imposed through this work to allow transformations to be done between printing characters (those of Table II). That is, restrict the domain and range of the transformations to the binary sequences of Table II.

We can further realize the 12 possible combinations of two sequences of same or different sets by exclusiveoring them and observe that the range of the transformations is given by the sets of sequences whose 4-left most are:

| 0 0 0 | 0 | for | A + A |
|-------|---|-----|-------|
|       |   |     | B + B |
|       |   |     | C + C |
|       |   |     | D + D |
| 0 0 0 | 1 | for | A + 3 |
|       |   |     | B + 2 |
|       |   |     | C + D |
|       |   |     | D + C |
| 011   | 0 | for | A + C |
|       |   |     | C + A |
|       |   |     | B + D |
|       |   |     | D + B |
| 0 1 1 | 1 | for | A + D |
|       |   |     | D + A |
|       |   |     | B + C |
|       |   |     | C + B |

#### C. TRANSFORMATIONS

From Table II it can be observed that these sequences no longer form a group under the exclusive-or operation, since choosing any two sequences will originate a new sequence not in the referred table. For example:

ج میشر

Plaintext character = A = 11000001 + Key character = L = 11001100Ciphered character = 00001101

And we obtained a sequence 00001101 not in the table. If we observe sets A, B, C and D of Table II, we will observe that each set has its 4-left most bits equal. Or that the dom ain of the transformation is given by the sequences whose 4-left most bits are:

 Set A
 1010

 Set B
 1011

 Set C
 1100

 Set D
 1101

In order to make the range of the transformations equal to its domain in accordance with the restriction imposed, an additional binary multiplier: The intermediate key (IK) was devised. It allowed for mapping into the 64 printing characters.

The value of IK is dependent on the particular transformation desired and the key to be used. For example: A system is designed to transform characters from set B into characters of set C for encryption. The decryption is done by doing the inverse. Now assume that the key to be used for a particular transformation belongs to set D.

an an an an an an an an

and a second rest of the second rest of the second

Plaintext character = 8 = 10111000 (Set B)

Key character = Z = 11011010 (Set D)

01100010

~ あいない ~ ちんちょう

IK = 10100000Crypto character = B = 11000010 (Set C)

The intermediate key value was obtained by exclusiveoring the 4-left most bits of the plaintext, the key and the crypto characters, as shown below,

> Plaintext character 1011 + Key character 1101 + Crypt character <u>1100</u> IK 10100000

For decrypting the inverse is done, that is:

Crypto character = B = 11000010 (Set C) Key character = Z = 11011010 (Set D)

00011000

 $IK = \frac{10100000}{100000}$ Plaintext character = 8 = 10111000

Based on the concepts so far presented and the idea of the intermediate key multiplier, that allows for sequences of Table II to behave like a group, Table III was constructed. It gives the necessary values of IK for all possible transformations in between sets. From this general table, it can be obtained typical tables of required values of IK for each specific transformation. For example, if we assume that the desired transformation between the four sets were



Then the required table of IK values will be:

|             |   |         |            | - | + |                                                                                                  |                     |          | 4                                             |
|-------------|---|---------|------------|---|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------|
|             |   |         | Q          |   | В | B                                                                                                | υ                   | ۵        | - A                                           |
|             | Δ |         | c          |   | A | A                                                                                                | D                   | υ        | of<br>the                                     |
|             |   |         | В          |   | ۵ | Q                                                                                                | A                   | Ð        | ion<br>that                                   |
|             |   | -       | A          |   | U | υ                                                                                                | В                   | A        | ntat                                          |
|             |   | S E J   | Q          |   | в | A                                                                                                | a                   | υ        | str                                           |
|             |   |         | ပ          |   | A | ß                                                                                                | υ                   | ۵        | rep<br>nary<br>e.                             |
|             | U | ы<br>В  | æ          |   | ۵ | υ                                                                                                | æ                   | A        | SCII<br>e bil<br>tabl                         |
| н<br>Ш      |   | EI<br>U | A          |   | υ | a                                                                                                | V                   | щ        | he A<br>t th<br>the                           |
| ŝ           |   | R A     | ٩          |   | υ | D                                                                                                | A                   | В        | ot t<br>D bu<br>: in                          |
| R<br>R<br>R | - | O C H A | ပ          |   | D | ບ                                                                                                | В                   | A        | is n<br>C,<br>sent                            |
| *           | ш |         | <b>د</b> ت |   | A | в                                                                                                | υ                   | D        | rhis<br>A, B,                                 |
|             | • | P<br>T  | A          | • | В | A                                                                                                | ۵                   | υ        | *                                             |
|             |   | RY      | ۵          |   | D | U                                                                                                | m                   | A        |                                               |
|             |   | υ       | U          |   | U | D                                                                                                | A                   | B        |                                               |
|             | A |         | 'n         |   | р | A                                                                                                | 0                   | ပ        | 0000                                          |
|             |   |         | A          |   | A | В                                                                                                | υ                   | D        | 010001100011000110001100001100001100000110000 |
|             |   |         |            |   | A | В                                                                                                | υ                   | D        |                                               |
|             |   |         |            |   |   | :<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>;<br>; | tnie<br>Dere<br>t92 | cy<br>57 | Where:                                        |

| VALUES       |
|--------------|
| КЕУ          |
| INTERMEDIATE |
| ŧ            |
| III          |
| TABLE        |

|             |   | _  |   |   |     |  |  |
|-------------|---|----|---|---|-----|--|--|
|             |   | КЕ | Y | S | SET |  |  |
|             |   | A  | В | С | D   |  |  |
|             | A | С  | D | A | В   |  |  |
| EXT         | В | С  | D | A | В   |  |  |
| AINT<br>SET | С | С  | D | A | В   |  |  |
| PI7         | D | С  | D | A | В   |  |  |

#### D. SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION

Although the scheme developed and presented until now provides for transformations using the 64 printing characters, a restriction was placed to be able to handle only the 26 letters of the English alphabet plus the additional 6 characters that appear in Table No. II, sets C and D. Thus, for the simple substitution ciphers transformations were designed between these two sets, that is,

Encryption Decryption С D Decryption / Encryption

And the corresponding table of values of intermediate keys will be:

|      |   | K I | EY | SET |   |  |  |
|------|---|-----|----|-----|---|--|--|
|      |   | A   | В  | С   | D |  |  |
| ХŢ   | A | В   | A  | D   | С |  |  |
| NTE  | B | В   | A  | D   | С |  |  |
| PLA] | С | В   | A  | D   | С |  |  |
|      | D | В   | A  | D   | С |  |  |

A CONTRACT OF A

Figure 2 shows in block diagram the computer realization of this simple substitution cipher. Appendix A gives the complete program to accomplish this. Figure 3 is an example of this cipher.

### E. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RESULTS

Natural languages, such as English, Spanish, German, French, etc., have a characteristic letter frequency. For example, the normal frequency for English is as shown in Table IV.

For the purpose of observing the statistical nature of plaintexts as well as of cryptograms obtained, a computer program (shown in Appendix B and C) was made to realize the following computations:

- Count the number of occurrences of each letter in a text.
- Calculate and plot the percentage of occurrence of each character in the text.
- Calculate the mean value of percentage of occurrences.
- Calculate the standard deviation of the percentage of occurrences.



to RO

1

茶本のないちまち ようちょうちょう ちょうしょう

ĵ

Block diagram of the program for the simple substitution cipher Figure 2.

NTHIS\_BOOK\_IS\_DESIGNED\_PRIMARILY\_FOR\_USE\_AS\_A\_FIRST\_YERR ..GRADUATE\_TEXT\_IN\_INFORMATION\_THEORY\_SUITABLE\_FOR\_BOTH\_E NGINEERS\_AND\_MATHEMATICIANS\_0\_IT\_IS\_ASSUMED\_THAT\_THE\_REA DER\_HAS\_SOME\_UNDERSTANDING\_OF\_FRESHMAN\_CALCULUS\_AND\_ELEM ENTARY\_PROBABILITY\_AND\_IN\_THE\_LATER\_CHAPTERS\_SOME\_INTROD UCTORY\_RANDOM\_PROCESS\_THEORY\_0\_UNFORTUNATELY\_THERE\_IS\_ON E\_MORE\_REQUIREMENT\_THAT\_IS\_HARDER\_TO\_MEET\_0\_THE\_READER\_M UST\_HAVE\_A\_REASONABLE\_LEVEL\_OF\_MATHEMATICAL\_MATURITY

### a) Plaintext message (input)

NCLODHUXXNHODHSRDOPYRSHGEOZVEOUNHQXEHBDRHVDHVHQOEDCHNRVE HPEVSBVCRHCROCHOYHOYQXEZVCOXYHCLRXENHDBOCVUURHQXEHUXCLHR YPOYRREDHVYSHZVCLRZVCOTOYYDHNHOCHODHVDDBZRSHCLVCHCLRHERV SREHLVDHDXZRHBYSREDCVYSOYPHXQHQERDLZVYHTVUTBUEDHVYSHRURZ RYCVENHGEMUVUCUCONHVYSHOYHCLRHUVCREHTLVGCREDHDXZRHOYCEXS BTCXENHEVYSXZHGEXTRDDHCLRXENHNHBYQXECBYYCRUNHCLRERHODHXY RHZXERHERFBOERZRYCHCLVCHODHLVESREHCXHZRRCHWHCLRHERVSREHZ BDCHLVARHVHERVDXYVUURHURARUHXQHZVCLRZVCOTVUHZVCBEOCN

b) Cryptogram message (output)

Figure 3. Example of a simple substitution cipher: Encrypting process. Key = W

------

| A | -     | 7.3% | E | - | 13.0% |
|---|-------|------|---|---|-------|
| B | -     | 0.9  | T | - | 9.3   |
| С | -     | 3.0  | N | - | 7.8   |
| D | -     | 4.4  | R | - | 7.7   |
| E | -     | 13.0 | I | - | 7.4   |
| F | -     | 2.8  | 0 | - | 7.4   |
| G | •     | 1.6  | A | - | 7.3   |
| H | -     | 3.5  | S | - | 6.3   |
| I | -     | 7.4  | D | - | 4.4   |
| J |       | 2.2  | H | - | 3.5   |
| * | unit. | J.3  | L | - | 3.5   |
| L | -     | 3.5  | С | - | 3.0   |
| M | -     | 2.5  | F | - | 2.8   |
| N | -     | 7.8  | P | - | 2.7   |
| 0 | -     | 7.4  | U | - | 2,7   |
| P | -     | 2.7  | M | - | 2.5   |
| Q | -     | 0.3  | Y | - | 1.9   |
| R | -     | 7.7  | G | - | 1.6   |
| S | -     | 6.3  | W | - | 1.6   |
| T | -     | 9.3  | V | - | 1.3   |
| U | -     | 2.7  | В | - | 0.9   |
| V | -     | 1.3  | X | - | 0.5   |
| W | -     | 1.6  | K | - | 0.3   |
| X | -     | 0.5  | Q | - | 0.3   |
| Y | -     | 1.9  | J | - | 0.2   |
| Z | -     | 0.1  | Z | - | 0.1   |
|   |       |      |   |   |       |

TABLE IV - FREQUENCY OF THE LETTERS OF THE ENGLISH ALPHABET, ARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY AND BY FREQUENCY For each transformation done, the text was analyzed by this program and the results were plotted. In the horizontal axis are the 32 chosen characters in the following order from zero to 31:

@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[/]^

In the vertical axis the percentage of occurrence scale or frequency distribution is plotted.

Examples of these plots are given by Figures 5 to 8. There the frequency distribution of letters for the following languages is plotted:

| Figure | 4: | ENGLISH |
|--------|----|---------|
| Figure | 5: | SPANISH |
| Figure | 6: | FRENCH  |
| Figure | 7: | ITALIAN |

The author has preferred to give the results achieved through this work by presenting these plots rather than giving messages and their cryptograms as examples of what was obtained. Inherent with these plots is an evaluation of the system used in each case. Additional information that will be found in these plots is the standard deviation of percentage of occurrence of the character in each cryptogram.

For the simple substitution cipher, it was expected to obtain similar results as for the plaintext of Figure 5. Figures 8 to 10 show the frequency distribution of characters when this system was used with different keys. As expected, similar results were obtained but with the values changed from one character to another. This occurred since one character or letter has just been replaced by another through these transformations. Table V presenting in tabular form the number of occurrences for these substitutions gives a figure of what has occurred with the messages in each case. The second states and the second states and

In Section IV, Theory of Secrecy Systems, it was stated that one goal to achieve ideal secrecy was to change the probability structure of natural languages to obtain an equiprobable occurrence of letters. This is the reason why the calculation of standard deviation was considered to evaluate secrecy obtained. Since the language to be used in this present work will be English it may be useful to keep in mind that the standard deviation for an English text is 3.81 as stated in Figure 4.

### F. PSEUDORANDOM SUBSTITUTION

The simple substitution cipher can also be called monoalphabetic cipher since there is only one alphabet to encipher the message. The cryptanalytic weakness of this cipher is the fact that a given plain language letter is always represented by the same crypto letter.



the second second

A REPORT OF MARK PLANE

Standard deviation = 3.81

▲ 「「「「「「「」」」」、「「」」、「」」、「」」、「」」、







in the second

ز ب

( )

'n,



مريدين

ساعة بالمناع والاعتدادة

aler walker was made a will we will be the state of a

÷.

ą



ł

ţ

Part of the Party of the

-----

15 P - - 2



~.zu= .

;

a Case I warnah har

.....

Charles and a second statement of the second s

angerer .

|                        |     |     | KEY  | KEY |     |     |  |  |  |
|------------------------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|--|--|--|
| Character <sup>.</sup> | 6   | A   | С    | G   | K   | N   |  |  |  |
| 6                      | 24  | 3   | 77   | 7   | 0   | 0   |  |  |  |
| A                      | 3   | 24  | 94   | 12  | . 0 | 248 |  |  |  |
| В                      | 94  | 77  | 3    | 37  | 24  | 0   |  |  |  |
| С                      | 77  | 94  | 24   | 128 | 4   | 0   |  |  |  |
| D                      | 128 | 37  | 7    | 77  | 248 | 0   |  |  |  |
| E                      | 37  | 128 | 12   | 94  | 0   | 0   |  |  |  |
| F                      | 12  | 7   | 37   | 3   | 0   | 4   |  |  |  |
| G                      | 7   | 12  | 128  | 24  | 0   | 24  |  |  |  |
| H                      | 4   | 24  | 0    | 248 | 77  | 12  |  |  |  |
| I                      | 24  | 4   | 0    | 0   | 94  | 7   |  |  |  |
| J                      | 0   | 0   | 24   | 0   | 3   | 128 |  |  |  |
| K                      | 0   | 0   | 4    | 0   | 24  | 37  |  |  |  |
| L                      | 0   | 0   | 248  | 0   | 7   | 94  |  |  |  |
| M                      | 0   | 0   | ۵    | 0   | 12  | 77  |  |  |  |
| N                      | 0   | 248 | ۵    | 24  | 37  | 24  |  |  |  |
| 0                      | 248 | 0   | a    | 4   | 128 | 3   |  |  |  |
| P                      | 11  | 105 | 27   | 12  | 3   | 68  |  |  |  |
| Q                      | 105 | 11  | 27   | 32  | 3   | 93  |  |  |  |
| R                      | 27  | 27  | 10.5 | 160 | 76  | 33  |  |  |  |
| S                      | 37  | 27  | 11   | 33  | 63  | 48  |  |  |  |
| T                      | 33  | 160 | 12   | 27  | 93  | 3   |  |  |  |
| U                      | 160 | 33  | 32   | 27  | 68  | 3   |  |  |  |
| V                      | 32  | 12  | 160  | 105 | 48  | 63  |  |  |  |
| W                      | 12  | 32  | 33   | 11  | 33  | 76  |  |  |  |
| Х                      | 63  | 76  | 3    | 93  | 27  | 32  |  |  |  |
| Y                      | 76  | 63  | 3    | 68  | 27  | 12  |  |  |  |
| Z                      | 3   | 3   | 76   | 48  | 105 | 33  |  |  |  |
| E                      | 3   | 3   | 63   | 33  | 11  | 160 |  |  |  |
| 1                      | 33  | 48  | 93   | 3   | 12  | 27  |  |  |  |
| Ĺ.                     | 48  | 33  | 68   | 3   | 32  | 27  |  |  |  |
| ^                      | 68  | 93  | 48   | 76  | 160 | 11  |  |  |  |
|                        | 93  | 68  | 33   | 63  | 33  | 105 |  |  |  |

NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES

Table No. V .- Simple substitution cipher Table of number of occurren\_ ces.

and the second second second

In this section, a digital polyalphabetic substitution very much alike to the Vigenere square, cited by Sinkov [Ref. 17], is designed. The originality of the scheme presented here is the fact that the different alphabets are used in a pseudorandom way and that this is generated through a simple algorithm in the computer. いいのでのからないないというとう

The basis for the program to realize this cipher is provided by the same algorithm as for the simple substitution case, the only variation being that the key will change for each character to be ciphered. These changes of key are controlled by a program and thus the inverse transformation can be made to decipher by using the same program. This fact that we are using a different key each time is the same as using a new substitution alphabet for each character.

It must be set clear here that the key used was a single letter and not a number of letters equal to the message length. This single letter was used to initialize a register used as a counter. For each new letter of the message the register contents were increased by one each time until a specific number was reached, in which case the register was reset to zero. This specific number is the desired number of alphabets to be used. Figure 11 gives a graphical idea of how this was accomplished. In the figure, N represents the total number of alphabets to be used; it ranges from one, for a simple substitution, to 32 when using all the possible alphabets.



----

ACTIVITY.

- -



The result expected for this cipher was the origination of an artificial language with 32 possible characters and with a letter frequency different than that of the plaintext message in natural English language.

To observe the results of this cipher two sets of transformations were made:

Using 15 alphabets and six different keys.
 The keys used were:

a) @
b) A
c) C
d) G
e) K
f) N

2. Using a single key and different number of alphabets, in the following order:

- a) 7 alphabets; key R
- b) 15 alphabets; key R
- c) 23 alphabets; key R
- d) 31 alphabets; key R

Figures 12 and 13 show some results obtained for the first set of transformations as a plot of percentage of occurrence of the 32 different characters. As can be observed, for the six cases, all the characters have a certain number of occurrences in the cryptogram obtained, thus giving rise to an artificial language of 32 characters with quite different letter frequency than the plaintext of Figure 4.

In the same way, Figures 14 and 15 show some results obtained for the second set of transformations, which are essentially the same as the first set.

A measure of how different these results are from the plaintext is provided by the standard deviations in each case and are here listed to provide a means of evaluating the results achieved:

| Number of alphabets | Key | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------|-----|----------------|
| 15                  | 6   | 1,528          |
| 15                  | A   | 1,528          |
| 15                  | С   | 1,528          |
| 15                  | G   | 1,528          |
| 15                  | к   | 1,528          |
| 15                  | N   | 1,528          |
| 7                   | R   | 1.467          |
| 15                  | R   | 1.545          |
| 23                  | R   | 1.407          |
| 31                  | R   | 1.329          |

These standard deviation values compared with the 3.81 for the plaintext, represent a significant flattening of the percentage of occurrence plots, or in other words, the cryptogram has a more equiprobable letter frequency.

A significant property of this scheme if we envision it as part of a digital communication system, is the fact that it offers no error propagation during the message processing.

The reason for this is the fact that each character is operated upon independently from all others. Thus, if there is an error in the bit representation of a letter, there will be an error in its transformation to crypto character or in the decryption of it and no error will occur in other characters due to it. 「ななななないないないない」ない、こと、こと、

In the next section, a cryptographic scheme will be presented that although contributing to the communication system degradation, gives better results in the sense that a nearly equiprobable artificial language is achieved which represents a significant achievement for security of data transmission and/or data storage.



1 2 2

- 1. - 181

. پر سر **نے م**داند

and the statistical sector



Pseudorandom cipher (Polyalphabetic substitution) Standard deviation = 1.528 Number of alphabets: 15 Key = K

State of the second second second

τ.

17



· man · · · · ·

かってない きょう いまい

.

\*\*\*\*\*



HURRER WE ARE ALMEN

يد مسدر

100 - 14 - A

### VI. THE DATA-KEYED CIPHER

تريجه ويعيينين مبرويد

## A. INTRODUCTION

In this section the data-keyed cipher is presented. First, a very general description of the system is given. Then the transfer function concept of the cipher and the reversibility and consistency of its is explained, together with the equated logical form of the transformation which the author appreciates as being a very meaningful representation of the cipher in logical form. After that the computer realization is presented in block diagram form. The test procedure for valuating secrecy accomplished and significant results are then given. Finally, the communication system degradation due to it is analyzed.

## B. DESCRIPTION AND REALIZATION

Section IV explains how the PDP-11/40 computer is handled to realize the simple substitution cipher, consistency was shown with some examples and further, the known cryptoanalytic weakness of it was explained and graphically represented by Fig. 4 where it can be observed the frequency distribution of the plaintext and of some cryptograms and their similarity can be established.

The data-keyed cipher can be explained in a general form as the scrambling of the bits of a character by operating on them by past characters, either of the plaintext, when ciphering, or of the cryptogram, when deciphering.

Provided these past characters are far enough apart in the sequence their operation on the character to be transformed will result in a nearly random transformation. This idea was supported by the fact that for far enough distance between two letters in a written language there is nearly no statistical dependence between them.

Figure 16 provides the conceptual idea of this cipher. At this point, two significant characteristics that distinguish this cipher are to be emphasized:

1. From Figure 16(a) and (b) it can be seen that both diagrams can be conceived as  $\epsilon$  transfer function that essentially perform similar transformations on their inputs. An advantage is that when this is realized in the computer by a program, the same program will execute both trans-formations; that of ciphering and deciphering.

2. From Figure 16(b) it can be observed that there is no feedback present, that is, the outputs are not dependent on past outputs. The significance of this fact will be considered at the end of this section when system degradation for this cipher is treated.

The realization of this ciphering scheme again uses the basic transformations presented in Section IV, plus additional steps are included to accomplish the data-keyed function. The conceptual idea given in Figure 16 can now be expressed in logical equated form as:



Carles and a second which which we want to a second

# a) Enciphering



b) Deciphering

Figure 16. Data-Keyed Cipher-Concept

| С | I | P | H | E | R | Ι | N | G | : |   |   | 1 | с <sub>ј</sub> | = | (K | + | c <sub>j-1</sub> ) | + | Pj             |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|----|---|--------------------|---|----------------|
| D | E | С | I | P | H | E | R | I | N | G | : |   | P <sub>j</sub> | = | (K | + | c <sub>j-1</sub> ) | ÷ | с <sub>ј</sub> |

「ないないないないないないないない」

where

| Pj               | = present plaintext character          |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|
| c,               | = present crypto character             |
| C <sub>j-1</sub> | = "i" times pr{ eding crypto character |
| К                | = Key character                        |

Again the operator used is the Exclusive-Or. These logical equations show the reversibility of the transformation and thus its consistency.

Figure 17 is now presented to give a more significant representation of the transformation to be realized. The index "i" is selective and it represents the distance between characters already explained.

Figure 18 shows the block diagram of the realization of this cipher in the  $P\Gamma 2-11/40$ .

Appendix D gives the complete listing of the program used.

C. TEST PROCEDURE

The plaintext message used to test the results of this cupher scheme was the one presented in Section IV with its



a) Ciphering:  $C_j = (K + C_{j-i}) + P_j$ 



b) Deciphering:  $P_j = (K + C_{j-i}) + C_j$ 

Figure 17. Data-Keyed Cipher-Realization



Figure 18. Data-Keyed Cipher-Block Diagram

ľ.

statistics representative of the English language as shown in Figure 4.

This cipher, as depicted by Figure 17, has two possible choices of variables, namely:

- The key, with a total of 32.

- The delay factor "i" which could be varied from zero, for a simple substitution; up to any number n. However, for any choice of n there will be the same amount of simple substitution characters at the beginning of the cryptogram. This disadvantage can be avoided by using for the first letters of the plaintext, meaningless text.

As for the simple substitution case, the intermediate keys were selected to reflect the transformations between sets C and D of Table II.

To observe the results obtained with this cipher two sets of transformations were made:

1. Using a fixed value of "i" and six different keys.
For i = 7 and the keys:

- a) @
- b) A
- c) C
- d) G
- e) K
- f) N
2. For a fixed key and the following values of "i"
(Key = J):

| a) | i = 2  |
|----|--------|
| b) | i = 3  |
| c) | i = 10 |
| đ) | i = 13 |
| e) | i = 17 |
| f) | i = 20 |

D. RESULTS

The results obtained for this cipher were, in all cases, significantly better than the Pseudorandom cipher of the previous section in the sense that the standard deviations were much lower, thus obtaining a nearly equiprobable text of cryptograms.

For the test procedure established, the following were the specific results obtained:

 For a fixed value of "i" and using 6 out of 32 possible keys the following were the values of standard deviation obtained:

| Key | <u>"i"</u> | Standard deviation |
|-----|------------|--------------------|
|     |            |                    |
| 6   | 7          | 0.5783             |
| A   | 7          | 0.6301             |
| с   | 7          | 0.5395             |
| G   | 7          | 0.5651             |
| К   | 7          | 0.5608             |
| N   | 7          | 0,6015             |

Figures 22 and 23 are some example plots for these cases. These figures are shown at the end of this section.

2. For a fixed key, different values of "i" were tried. The values of standard deviation obtained in each case were:

| Key | <u>"i"</u> | Standard deviation |
|-----|------------|--------------------|
| -   | •          |                    |
| J   | 2          | 0.5761             |
| J   | 3          | 0.5344             |
| J   | 10         | 0.528              |
| J   | 13         | 0.5317             |
| J   | 17         | 0.4609             |
| J   | 20         | 0.501              |

Figures 24 and 25 are some example plots for these cases and are presented at the end of this section.

We can now compare these results with the statistics of a plaintext English message with a standard deviation of 3.81 (see Figure 4). A significant flattening of the percentage of occurrence plots has occurred. In addition the statistical dependence of occurrence of the letter in the message has been hidden. The reason for this will be explained in the last part of this section where the nature of the ciphering scheme is explained in detail, together with the inherent degradation to a communication system due to it.

In Section IV it was stated, from Shannon [Ref. 15], that an ideal cipher may be an artificial language in which all letters are equiprobable and successive letters occurring independently. This is nearly the case for this cipher. Now a simple substitution, such as the one presented in Section V, can be performed on the message without making it easier to decipher.

3. A very meaningful characteristic of this scheme was the fact that the same program recovers or deciphers the message. Figures 19 and 20 present two examples of the encrypting results after being processed by the program corresponding to this cipher.

To give an idea of the number of occurrences of each character in the cryptograms for each of the 12 cases of (1) and (2), Tables VI and VII are next presented.

4. The implementation of this cipher in a digital computer can also be seen as the implementation of a code where the transformations are dependent on a key (a letter or character), the present letter to be encoded and some past crypto character.

E. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATION

Due to the nature of the process of ciphering and deciphering of this system, it can be said that when it comes to play an integral part of a communication system, it, at the most, will double the probability of block error. Here the block length has been 8 bits corresponding to a

CTHIS\_BOOK\_IS\_DESIGNED\_PRIMARILY\_FOR\_USE\_AS\_A\_FIRST\_YEAR \_GRADUATE\_TEXT\_IN\_INFORMATION\_THEORY\_SUITABLE\_FOR\_BOTH\_E NGINEERS\_AND\_MATHEMATICIANS\_@\_IT\_IS\_ASSUMED\_THAT\_THE\_REA DER\_HAS\_SOME\_UNDERSTANDING\_OF\_FRESHMAN\_CALCULUS\_AND\_ELÉM ENTARY\_PROBABILITY\_AND\_IN\_THE\_LATER\_CHAPTERS\_SOME\_INTROD UCTORY\_RANDOM\_PROCESS\_THEORY\_@\_UNFORTUNATELY\_THERE\_IS\_ON E\_MORE\_REQUIREMENT\_THAT\_IS\_HARDER\_TO\_MEET\_@\_THE\_READER\_M UST\_HAVE\_A\_REASONABLE\_LEVEL\_OF\_MATHEMATICAL\_MATURITY

## a) Plaintext message (input)

CGE Z@LQNN\_GP@@VZLUS JVWJIM\_ J\_G JUCAZ@NKKEUMXABYGPLLHFNC@RN @NGNTGPIV@@ZO@LSELZWZNM JYKPEW@JV\_WAAK@LNHUPC JLYPIIORJWEV T JELNQDFH\_VX@\_VASYXZGUVEQTHFTINLMCHJVILJSN\_FARCMOOTPMCN\_ XYELVQHCHUEZJGUTODKMXZROSPGQ JFWOU@N\_LEK\_W\_NIPMKCUREEVR 3 3 S\_LWGHANBS JUVROTEIAWEUBOXEFN JI 3NOSG@ JR\_OHUF@ABSQCIN 3FC\_V HYKQGICGZTN JYE@FVTZMIIG JPXKGEZKK 3 JWFBLVYJEXLNK 3\_K 3DVNG@R JRZZOQMEECLPNNSUVD@GUUDINDLNNDS\_MHKPK2UYJDXLLQSEKRZE2@OE MBMGQRJ JAPAFWPJQNRPYQLUNIT\_E 3YIYEETSENSEOE0 3YIEJELE

b) Cryptogram message (output)

Figure 19. Data-Keyed cipher Encrypting process

DTHIS\_BOOK\_IS\_DESIGNED\_PRIMAPILY\_FOR\_USE\_AS\_A\_FIRST\_YEAR .GRADUATE\_TEXT\_IN\_INFORMATION\_THEORY\_SU)TABLE\_FOR\_BOTH\_E NGINEERS\_AND\_MATHEMATICIANS\_@\_IT\_IS\_ASSUMED\_THAT\_THE\_REA DER\_HAS\_SOME\_UNDERSTANDING\_OF\_FRESHMAN\_CALCULUS\_AND\_ELEM ENTARY\_PROBABILITY\_AND\_IN\_THE\_LATER\_CHAPTERS\_SOME\_INTROD UCTORY\_RANDOM\_PROCESS\_THEORY\_@\_UNFORTUNATELY\_THERE\_IS\_ON E\_MORE\_REQUIREMENT\_THAT\_IS\_HARDER\_TO\_MEET\_@\_THE\_READER\_M UST\_HAVE\_A\_REASONABLE\_LEVEL\_OF\_MATHEMATICAL\_MATURITY

a) Plaintext message (input)

DØN 3GKVEELGPØØVZERTZØPMNJE 3EG 3UCA 3VIELBRJXABYGPELOAIDVUI GNGNTGPIVGG 3HGKTNEZWZNM 3VEWNPGMOXWAAKØENHRWYZKOWNIØRJWEV TZNXEVCAOEVXØEVASOE 3@RØNVTHFTINEMVOMØNKMTXEFAROMOHSWJDEX EVELVØHCHRN 3MØRSYDKMXZROSWØVZAPHRØNELEKEWXENWJEDRPEEVR 33 SXKPØOFIES 3UVROTENFPNREVEEFN 31 3NOTØGZUXHOUFØABSØONEZADXØ OVKOGIEGZSE ZOBGAQTZMIIG 3PELØB 3EEZ 3WFBEVVJNEKIEZXE 3DVNGØR 3F 3 3HVJDNEEPNWSUVEGØRRENEDENNDSEMOENE 2ROMOXELØSEKU 3N 3GHN

b) Cryptogram message (output)

Figure 20. Data-Keyed cipher Encrypting process

|           |    | ]   | KEY  | ( : | ( i = 7 ) |    |  |  |
|-----------|----|-----|------|-----|-----------|----|--|--|
| Character | 6  | A   | С    | G   | K         | N  |  |  |
| 6         | 36 | 33  | 40   | 46  | 45        | 32 |  |  |
| A         | 35 | 38  | 37   | 40  | 40        | 34 |  |  |
| В         | 35 | 40  | 33   | 32  | 32        | 42 |  |  |
| С         | 55 | 50  | 51   | 52  | 53        | 50 |  |  |
| D         | 47 | 42  | 56   | 50  | 42        | 48 |  |  |
| E         | 46 | 51  | 52   | 49  | 46        | 59 |  |  |
| F         | 47 | 55  | 41   | 42  | 44        | 47 |  |  |
| G         | 50 | 42  | 41   | 40  | 46        | 36 |  |  |
| H         | 41 | 35  | 48   | 35  | 43        | 41 |  |  |
| I         | 38 | 44  | 44   | 38  | 41        | 52 |  |  |
| J         | 34 | 41  | 28   | 31  | 29        | 33 |  |  |
| K         | 47 | 40  | 40   | 44  | 38        | 34 |  |  |
| L         | 44 | 37  | 34   | 47  | 48        | 37 |  |  |
| M         | 42 | 49  | 39   | 45  | 45        | 47 |  |  |
| N         | 29 | 29  | 32   | 29  | 29        | 33 |  |  |
| 0         | 32 | 32  | 42   | 38  | 37        | 33 |  |  |
| P         | 51 | 37  | . 47 | 38  | 36 ·      | 45 |  |  |
| Q         | 43 | 57  | 48   | 44  | 48        | 51 |  |  |
| R         | 50 | 55  | 45   | 43  | 61        | 58 |  |  |
| S         | 58 | 53  | 62   | 60  | 61        | 50 |  |  |
| т         | 53 | 39. | 42   | 51  | 49        | 46 |  |  |
| U         | 40 | 54  | 43   | 47  | 50        | 41 |  |  |
| v         | 51 | 51. | 48   | 50  | 52        | 63 |  |  |
| W         | 38 | 38  | 49   | 51  | 50        | 53 |  |  |
| x         | 59 | 62  | 45   | 54  | 56        | 47 |  |  |
| Y         | б4 | 61  | 53   | 56  | 53        | 49 |  |  |
| Z         | 43 | 37  | 54   | 40  | 38        | 50 |  |  |
| Γ         | 37 | 43  | 51   | 51  | 52        | 36 |  |  |
| 1         | 52 | 40  | 46   | 37  | 39        | 43 |  |  |
| Ĵ         | 51 | 63  | ຸ 58 | 55  | 51        | 60 |  |  |
| ^         | 52 | 52  | 46   | 60  | 42        | 58 |  |  |
|           | 52 | 52  | 57   | 57  | 56        | 44 |  |  |

NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES

Lotter Will West

-----

Table No. VI .- Data-keyed cipher Table of number of occurrences.

|           |    | " i ' | VALUES | ( ) | XEY = J | )  |
|-----------|----|-------|--------|-----|---------|----|
| Character | 2  | 3     | 10     | 13  | 17      | 20 |
| 6         | 37 | 42    | 40     | 32  | 42      | 46 |
| À         | 41 | 40    | 36     | 35  | 41      | 48 |
| В         | 48 | 39    | 49     | 34  | 36      | 40 |
| С         | 44 | 37    | 38     | 40  | 29      | 39 |
| D         | 34 | 43    | 47     | 41  | 41      | 50 |
| Е         | 43 | 41    | 46     | 49  | 50      | 47 |
| F         | 47 | 43    | 35     | 47  | 42      | 48 |
| G         | 45 | 46    | 48     | 39  | 40      | 33 |
| Н         | 48 | 39    | 44     | 33  | 48      | 38 |
| I         | 38 | 36    | 34     | 53  | 45      | 35 |
| J         | 32 | 54    | 36     | 46  | 42      | 38 |
| K         | 52 | 42    | 40     | 38  | 41      | 31 |
| L         | 41 | 42    | 37     | 38  | 40      | 38 |
| M         | 37 | 41    | 34     | 44  | 36      | 36 |
| N         | 45 | 28    | 52     | 48  | 35      | 42 |
| 0         | 26 | 45    | 42     | 41  | 50      | 49 |
| Р         | 44 | 46    | 49     | 59  | 51      | 50 |
| Q         | 36 | 52    | 58     | 50  | 48      | 45 |
| R         | 61 | 36    | 46     | 53  | 47      | 45 |
| S         | 46 | 65    | 37     | 56  | 48      | 62 |
| T         | 60 | 62    | 43     | 43  | 52      | 48 |
| U         | 49 | 50    | 47     | 54  | 56      | 50 |
| v         | 54 | 44    | 45     | 55  | 40      | 55 |
| W         | 46 | 50    | 62     | 38  | 50      | 49 |
| X         | 43 | 58    | 53     | 36  | 46      | 44 |
| Y         | 49 | 42    | 51     | 49  | 49      | 52 |
| Z         | 44 | 45    | 41     | 49  | 57      | 54 |
| Ļ         | 44 | 57    | 53     | 55  | 49      | 30 |
| /         | 60 | 50    | 48     | 40  | 39      | 45 |
| Ž         | 54 | 42    | 62     | 46  | 55      | 55 |
|           | 52 | 50    | 55     | 55  | 53      | 50 |
|           | 52 | 45    | 44     | 56  | 54      | 48 |

NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES

:---

,

-

,

L.

. :

and the second

Table No. VII.- Data-keyed cipher Table of number of occurrences. byte. It must be emphasized that, although for ease of computer realization the 8-bit byte was used to represent a letter; only 5 bits could have been enough since we are using only 32 letters or characters.

This increase in probability of error can be said to be significant but with the availability of error correcting codes the initial probability of error can be reduced as desired and appropriately so that doubling it when using the cryptosystem will not be that significant. Further, since a computer is being used to implement it, it also can be used to realize a suitable error correcting scheme. In the next section, a suitable error correcting scheme is presented, that will essentially overcome this degradation.

The examples that follow are intended to explain how the probability of block error is doubled and also the existence of a transient simple substitution for the first "i" characters.

Based on these two examples the following observations can be made:

1. There is a transient simple substitution for the first "i" characters when enciphering. This is the case of  $C_1$ ,  $C_2$  and  $C_3$  from Example 1.

2. After the transient simple substitution, the crypto characters are a result of a number of plaintext characters. And, the higher the index of the crypto to be obtained, the more the number of plaintext characters on which it depends.

| Example         | No.  | 1   |   |                | E  | ncip             | her | ing               | pı   | 00             | ess             |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |
|-----------------|------|-----|---|----------------|----|------------------|-----|-------------------|------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|---|-----------------|
|                 |      |     |   |                | T  | rans             | for | mat               | ior  | 1:             | c <sub>j</sub>  | #                        | (K              | +              | с <sub>ј</sub> . | -i <sup>)</sup>  | + | Pj              |
| Pla             | inte | ext | S | equ            | en | ce:              | P   | ., <sup>P</sup> 2 | ,P   | 3, P           | 4' <sup>P</sup> | '5 <b>'</b> <sup>1</sup> | <sup>P</sup> 6' | P7'            | P8               | , <sup>P</sup> 9 |   |                 |
| Let             | i =  | = 3 |   |                |    |                  |     |                   |      |                |                 |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |
| c1              | =    | K   | + | <sup>P</sup> 1 |    |                  |     |                   |      |                |                 |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |
| c <sub>2</sub>  | =    | K   | + | <sup>P</sup> 2 |    |                  |     |                   |      |                |                 |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |
| c3              | =    | K   | + | <sup>P</sup> 3 |    |                  |     |                   |      |                |                 |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |
| c <sub>4</sub>  | =    | K   | + | c <sub>1</sub> | +  | <sup>P</sup> 4   | 1   | K +               | • (1 | K +            | P]              | )                        | + I             | 4              | =                | <sup>P</sup> 1   | + | P4              |
| c <sub>5</sub>  | =    | K   | + | с <sub>2</sub> | +  | <sup>₽</sup> 5   | 8   | к +               | - (: | K +            | P2              | 2)                       | + 1             | 5              | -                | <sup>P</sup> 2   | + | <sup>P</sup> 5  |
| с <sub>б</sub>  | =    | K   | + | с <sub>3</sub> | +  | <sup>Р</sup> 6   | =   | К -               | - (  | к +            | P               | 3)                       | + 1             | 6              | =                | <sup>Р</sup> З   | + | P6              |
| с <sub>7</sub>  | H    | K   | + | с <sub>4</sub> | +  | P7               | =   | K -               | + (  | P1             | + I             | ?4)                      | +               | <sup>P</sup> 7 |                  |                  |   |                 |
| C <sub>8</sub>  | *    | K   | + | с <sub>5</sub> | +  | P8               | =   | K -               | + (  | <sup>P</sup> 2 | + I             | ? <sub>5</sub> )         | +               | P8             |                  |                  |   |                 |
| وc              | =    | K   | + | °6             | +  | Р <sub>9</sub>   | =   | K -               | + (  | <sup>Р</sup> З | + 1             | °6)                      | +               | Р <sub>9</sub> |                  |                  |   |                 |
| c <sub>10</sub> | =    | K   | + | с <sub>7</sub> | +  | P10              | =   | P                 | 1 +  | P              | +               | P7                       | , +             | P1             | 0                |                  |   |                 |
| c <sub>11</sub> | =    | K   | + | с <sub>8</sub> | +  | P <sub>11</sub>  | =   | P                 | 2 +  | P              | ; +             | P 8                      | ; +             | P1             | 1                |                  |   |                 |
| C <sub>12</sub> | =    | K   | + | c <sub>9</sub> | +  | P12              | 2   | P                 | 3 +  | P              | 5 +             | Pg                       | , +             | P1             | 2                |                  |   |                 |
| c <sub>13</sub> | 3 =  | K   | + | c <sub>1</sub> | 0  | + <sup>P</sup> 1 | 3   | = ]               | K +  | P              | L +             | P4                       | +               | P7             | +                | P10              | + | <sup>P</sup> 13 |
|                 |      |     |   |                |    |                  |     |                   |      |                |                 |                          |                 |                |                  |                  |   |                 |

## Example No. 2

Deciphering process

Transformation:  $P_j = (K + C_{j-i}) + C_j$ 

and a series of the second of the second sec

Cryptogram sequence:  $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, C_5, C_6, C_7, C_8, C_9$ 

Let i = 3, as before  $P_1 = K + C_1$   $P_2 = K + C_2$   $P_3 = K + C_3$   $P_4 = K + C_4 + C_1$   $P_5 = K + C_5 + C_2$   $P_6 = K + C_6 + C_3$   $P_7 = K + C_7 + C_4$   $P_8 = K + C_8 + C_5$   $\cdots$  $P_n = K + C_n + C_{n-i}$ 

3. The order of dependency observed in Example 1 is different for the deciphering case, where the recovering of the text is just dependent on two crypto characters. Thus, one error in the crypto sequence will just give rise to two errors in the plaintext.

Figure 21 gives an exa ple of the transient simple substitution explained. The value of "i" chosen there is 50. As an example it can be observed here that for the first 50 characters of the plaintext the letter R is always substituted by the letter C.

· e ·

ATHIS\_IS\_AN\_EXAMPLE\_OF\_A\_CYCLIC\_ERROR\_CORRECTING\_CODE\_AP PLIED\_TO\_A\_CIPHERED\_MESSAGE\_\_\_NOISE\_GENERATED\_IN\_A\_PROGR AM\_IS\_MODULO\_TWO\_ADDED\_TO\_THE\_MESSAGE\_TO\_TEST\_THE\_EFFECT IVENESS\_OF\_THE\_CODE@

a) Plaintext

Transient substitution

REYXBNXBNPLNTIPNAGTNEWNPNRHRGXPNTCCECNRECCTREMLVNPEUOGMO OUZZUAKZGPBSUEWZDZU@EN@ONTZJMMOGV@ZMUPG@KLCE&@GEIMMNFTNF OWDLBLLEPCWZD@FPBPZGPLDHSOHLTD@OBO@GEMOYNHEMMCKLPBPVPPGG THLLWEHJEONGYECROONR

b) Cryptogram

Figure 21. Data-keyed Cipher - Example of transient substitution. i = 50.



\*\*\*

• •

والمتاريخ وتكرير فالاختراف فيرتد

ş





時代のなるなななる ようしい 1



والمتعادية والمتحدث والمتعادية والمتحادي والمتحاد والمتحاد والمتحادة

Mar was ...



Figure 25. Data-keyed cipher Standarĉ deviation = 0.4609 Key = J i = 17 ٠.

#### VII. ERROR CORRECTING SCHEME

The data-keyed cipher of the last section offers to the system a degradation in the sense that the probability of word error is doubled due to the nature of the encipherment process, as was explained. This increase in error will undoubtedly affect the legibility of any message. Thus it was necessary to look into error correcting codes that will eventually overcome this present disadvantage. Again the availability of the digital computer proved to be very useful for enciphering the message and to encode it for transmission.

The error correcting code developed was intended for transmission over a memoryless binary symmetric channel. A memoryless channel is the one on which noise does not depend upon previous events. A binary symmetric channel is one for which the probability of a zero to be changed to a one, is equal to the probability of a one to be changed to a zero, during transmission.

Notation that will encountered through this section follows:

| k | = | Number of information digits                            |
|---|---|---------------------------------------------------------|
| m | H | Number of check bits                                    |
| n | = | Code word length $(n = k + m)$                          |
| е | H | Maximum number of correctible bit errors<br>in one word |
| R | = | Data rate ( $R = k/n$ )                                 |

- $\beta$  = Binary symmetric channel parameter p(1/0) = p(0/1)
- d = Hamming distance between code words.

A. BEST CODE DETERMINATION

The noise channel theorem as stated by Shannon [Ref. 14]

is:

Let a discrete channel have the capacity C bits/sec. and a discrete source has the entropy per second H. If H < C there exists a coding scheme such that the output of the source can be transmitted over the channel with an arbitrarily small frequency of errors. If H > C, it is possible to encode the source so that the equivocation is less than  $H - C + \varepsilon$ , where  $\varepsilon$  is arbitrarily small. There is no method of encoding that gives an equivocation less than H - C.

The discrete source entropy for long messages consistin of discrete symbols is given by

 $H(\mathbf{x}) = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \log p_i$ 

where  $p_i$  is the probability of occurrence of a given symbol. In the situation where the symbols are transmitted over a noisy channel a given symbol  $x_i$  may be received as  $y_i$ . Shannon's measure of uncertainty at the receiver of what was actually transmitted is defined as:

 $H(\mathbf{x}/\mathbf{y}) = - \sum_{\mathbf{x}} \sum_{\mathbf{y}} p(\mathbf{x}_{i}, \mathbf{y}_{i}) \log p(\mathbf{x}_{i}/\mathbf{y}_{i})$ 

For the binary symmetric channel this uncertainty is given by:

$$H(x/y) = -(\beta \log \beta + (1-\beta) \log (1-\beta))$$

Then the channel capacity is given by

C = H(x) - H(x/y) maximized for H(x).

A significant parameter commonly used is the probability of word error in the message instead of the uncertainty measure. The probability of word error is defined as:

## P(e) = Number of wrong decoded words Number of words in message

It must be noted at this point that there will not necessarily be a code word for each ASCII character used. In fact this was the case for the code implemented, where each 4 bits of the message sequence is encoded into a 15-bit word. Thus, each 8-bit ASCII character was encoded into two words for transmission.

A "best code" means one that has least probability of error for any give channel  $\beta$  and the highest rate given by the ratio of information bits over the bit-length of each code word. The error correction ability of the code can be derived from the Varsharmov-Gilbert-Sacks condition (upper bound)

$$2^{m} > \sum_{\substack{i=0 \\ i=0}}^{2e-1} {\binom{n-1}{i}}$$

which is a sufficient but not necessary condition. And from the Hammings lower bound inequality

$$2^{m} \geq \sum_{i=0}^{e} {n \choose i}$$

which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for designing an e-tuple error correcting code.

Conversely, using these conditions, once a code is chosen and specified by its rate (R) and code word length (n), the number of correctible e-tuples can be determined.

The theoretical value of probability of error is given by Ash [Ref. 18]:

$$p(e) = 1 = \sum_{i=0}^{e} N_i \beta^i (1-\beta)^{n-i}$$

where  $N_i$  is the number of correctible e-tuple errors, and  $e_i = 0, 1, 2, ...,$  up to the maximum number of correctible errors per word.

The Hamming distance (d) is the minimum distance between code words. If d happens to be even and the maximum value of e is given by (d-1)/2, this will yield a fraction.

Then the number of maximum e-tuple errors is given by Shiva [Ref. 19]

$$\frac{\text{Number of correctible d/2 errors}}{\text{Total number of d/2 errors}} = 1 - \frac{\frac{\mu(\mu+1)}{2}}{n}$$

$$\frac{d/2}{d/2}$$

where 
$$\mu = \frac{di}{(\frac{d}{2})i(\frac{d}{2})i}$$

For the same channel ( $\beta$  constant), reducing the probability of error results in a reduction of the code rate. Working backwards, for any given probability of error and word length, one can estimate the information length and code rate by using the Varsharmov-Gilbert-Sacks condition.

In the present work a cyclic code with a rate R = 4/15is implemented to overcome the degradation due to the noisy channel. Its effectiveness was tested by simulating transmission over a binary symmetric channel with different values of  $\beta$ .

B. THE (15,4) CYCLIC CODE AND ITS COMPUTER REALIZATION

The theory of Cyclic Codes and their representation by means of a k-stage feedback shift register is very well treated by Ash [Ref. 18].

1. Selection of Polynomial

In order to be compatible with the 16-bit organization of the PDP-11/40, the characteristic polynomial for

this code was chosen from Appendix C of Peterson [Ref. 20], and it was

$$G(x) = x^4 + x + 1$$

which is an irreducible polynomial and which can be represented by a 4-stage shift register as shown in Figure 26. Since G(x) is a maximum period irreducible polynomial, with a period  $2^4 - 1 = 15$ , it divides the polynomial  $x^{15} + 1$  (modulo 2). Thus, the check polynomial for this code will be

$$H(x) = \frac{x^{15} + 1}{G(x)} = x^{11} + x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$$

The polynomial cnosen originates a (15,4) cyclic code, that is, a code where

$$k = 4$$
  
m = 11  
n = 15

The coefficients of the check polynomial for the code word 00010011010111. Since the code is cyclic, any cyclic shift of the check word and any linear combination of code words is another code word. This property of the cyclic code represents an advantage for decoding purposes.

Procedure:

The 4-bit word to be coded is loaded in parallel into the 4-stage shift register feedback configuration. н.

đ

\*\*\* \* \* \* \*

\$

Then the shift register is let to run until a 15-bit serial cutput (the code word) is obtained. 2.



- Input word
- 4-stage encoder of the characteristic + x + 1 polynomial  $G(x) = x^4$ Figure 26.

•

1. S. 1.

#### 2. Computer Realization of Encoder

Encoding in a digital computer is accomplished by realizing the shift-register operations by implementing a matrix multiplication of the message word by a generator matrix.

The generator matrix for the characteristic polynomial  $G(x) = x^4 + x + 1$  used, was

which when multiplied by the message word  $[x]_{1,4}$ , yielded the code word  $[w]_{1,15}$ .

A further comment can be made on the structure of the generator matrix: The four rows are code words and they are linearly independent, and, any of the other code words can be obtained by linear combination of these four rows. For ease of computer implementation, to obtain a code word it was only needed to exclusive-or the rows of  $[G]_{1,15}$  where a 1 occurs in the message word. For example,

 $[X]_{1,4} = 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0$  (message word)

First row of G = 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 + Second row of G = 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 Code word 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1

Appendix E shows the complete listing of this encoding program.

3. Minimum Distance Decoder

Table VIII gives the code words for the 16 possible message words when the (15,4) cyclic code is used. It can be observed that the Hamming distance between these code words is 8. That is, the number of different digits between code words is 8 (d = 8).

With the minimum distance decoder, if any combination of  $\frac{d-1}{2}$  or less errors occur in a received code word, it can be corrected with absolute certainty. For this code, any 3 or less errors can be corrected successfully.

For the case when 4-digit errors occur ( $\epsilon = 4$ ), the Varsharmov-Gilbert-Sacks condition (Upper bound)

$$2^{m}$$
  $\sum_{i=0}^{2e-1} {n-1 \choose i}$ 

is not satisfied and thus there exists an uncertainty on whether a 4-digit error will be corrected. It has been found experimentally that 67.8% of different combinations of 4-digit errors can be corrected. Appendix G shows the complete listing of the decoding program.

## C. NOISY CHANNEL SIMULATION

Table IX provides the expected probabilities of error for transmission over a noisy binary symmetric channel when using the (15,4) cyclic code presented, as given by

| In | 501<br>%( | m | ation<br>1 |   |   |   |   | Co | bđe | đ | Wo | ord | 1  |   |   |   |   |   |
|----|-----------|---|------------|---|---|---|---|----|-----|---|----|-----|----|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0  | 0         | 0 | 0          | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0  | 0   | 0 | 0  | 0   | 0  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0  | 0         | 0 | 1          | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0  | 0   | 1 | 1  | 0   | T  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 0  | 0         | 1 | 0          | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0  | 1   | 1 | 0  | 1   | 0  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 0  | 0         | 1 | 1          | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0  | 1   | 0 | 1  | 1   | 1. | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 0  | 1         | 0 | 0          | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1  | 1   | 0 | 1  | 0   | 1  | i | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 0  | 1         | 0 | 1          | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1  | 1   | 1 | 0  | 0   | 0  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 0  | 1         | 1 | 0          | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1  | 0   | 1 | 1  | 1   | 1  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0  | 1         | 1 | 1          | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1  | 0   | 0 | 0  | 1   | 0  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1  | 0         | 0 | 0          | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1  | 0   | 0 | 1  | 1   | 0  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ì  | 0         | 0 | 1          | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1  | 0   | 1 | 0  | 1   | 1  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1  | 0         | 1 | 0          | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1  | 1   | l | 1  | 0   | 0  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1  | 0         | 1 | 1          | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1  | 1   | 0 | 0  | 0   | 1  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1  | 1         | 0 | 0          | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0  | 1   | 0 | 0  | 1   | 1  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1  | 1         | 0 | 1          | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0  | 1   | 1 | 1  | 1   | 0  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1  | 1         | 1 | 0          | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0  | 0   | ] | 0  | 0   | 1  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1  | 1         | 1 | 1          | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0  | 0   | 0 | 1  | 0   | 0  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

TABLE VIII. Message words and their correspondent code word for the (15,4) cyclic code

| Channel<br>β | Probability of error P(e) |
|--------------|---------------------------|
| 0.07050      | 5.4480 x $10^{-3}$        |
| 0.09797      | $2.9176 \times 10^{-2}$   |
| 0.12426      | $6.2425 \times 10^{-2}$   |
| 0.13992      | $1.2542 \times 10^{-1}$   |
| 0.1709       | $1.8780 \times 10^{-1}$   |
| 0.26613      | $4.9052 \times 10^{-1}$   |

" and and a the survey of the second strates the second states

TABLE IX. P(e) vs. channel  $\beta$  for the code (15,4)

Cetinyilmaz [Ref. 21]. In the same reference a noise generating program is presented to simulate different conditional probabilities of error for the BSC. The same program was used in this thesis to simulate a noise BSC and to test the effectiveness of the code implemented. Appendix F gives a listing of the program.

Having the enciphering scheme, the error correcting code and a mean for introducing noise into the message to reflect different values of  $\beta$  for the channel, all were combined to simulate a Secure Digital Communication System, as depicted by Figure 27.

The following is the complete program flow for the system:





a) Input program (address 20000 to 20036) - The message is typed in. The program stores the message in ASCII code form into memory locations 30002-32000 (16-bit form). ANT STATE

and a second of the second second

ţ

1000

b) Data-keyed cipher program (10000-11044) - The key to be used is typed in, the program stores it at 30000. The program takes the message from 30000-32000, ciphers it and then stores it at 40000-42000 (16-bit form). The parameter "i" can be selected at address 10014.

c) Input interface program (14000-14036) - This program puts the ciphered text, already in 16-bit form, into 8-bit form to be handled by the encoding program. 8-bit characters are moved into memory locations 51000-52000.

d) Encoder program (14040-14152) - Encodes message and stores coded words into memory locations 52000-54000. Generator matrix is stored at

| Memory location | Content |
|-----------------|---------|
| 50200           | 104656  |
| 50202           | 46570   |
| 50204           | 23274   |
| 50206           | 11536   |

e) Noise generating program (14540-14754)

f) Noise mixing program (14756-15050) - Takes coded words from 52000-54000 and exclusive-ors them with noise words at 32000-34000, thus introducing noise into the text. Results are stored back at 52000-54000.

g) Minimum distance decoder (14154-14436) - Takes the distorted coded words from location 52000-54000, decodes them if they are correctible and stores the decoded words at location 56000-57000. Check polynomial is 11536 at address 50104.

h) Output interface program (14440-14464) - Takes decoded words and moves them to 30000-32000 to be deciphered.

i) Data-keyed deciphering program (10000-11044) - Same as (b), the only change needed is to change the contents of address 10012 from 40002 to 30002 to be compatible with the decipherment process. The program deciphers the message and stores the results in memory locations 40000-42000.

j) Output program (12000-12244) - Prints the cryptogram and the plaintext message.

#### VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

After looking at the computer organization and establishing a basis to realize reversible transformations, three cryptographic systems were implemented: 5.4

と やりったたい かい

1. Simple substitution

2. Pseudo-random cipher

3. Data-keyed cipher

The first, provided the basis for the other two. It was not intended to provide any significant amount of security since the cryptanalytic weakness of a simple substitution is well known.

The pseudo-random cipher is provided with a means to do polyalphabetic substitutions. This kind of cipher is known to be time consuming when done manually. The algorithm used to generate pseudo-random keys was a simple one, though it can be as complex as the user desires.

With the data-keyed cipher very significant results were obtained in the sense that its distribution plots were fairly flat. A disadvantage presented by this cipher was the error propagation when deciphering. This fact motivated the author to look into error correcting codes to use them with this or any other system. A (15,4) cyclic error correcting block code was implemented. This code contributed appreciably to reduce the probability of error,

P(e), when transmission was simulated over a noisy binary symmetric channel.

ite J

Finally, it can be said that the digital computer is suitable for encrypting and coding data for transmission, providing at the same time many different alternatives for both functions. With the advent of microprocessors and with communication systems tending to become all digital, it is certain that we will see in the future a computer performing these functions together with many more.

## APPENDIX A. - PROGRAM FOR THE

1

SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION CIPHER

| 010000 | 1002000 |
|--------|---------|
| 019902 | 7005002 |
| 019994 | 2005037 |
| 010006 | /177560 |
| 013010 | /105737 |
| 010012 | /177550 |
| 013014 | /100375 |
| 019016 | 2013700 |
| 010020 | /177562 |
| 010022 | 2005003 |
| 010024 | /020027 |
| 010025 | /000260 |
| 019030 | /100003 |
| 010032 | /012703 |
| 010034 | /000001 |
| 019026 | /088415 |
| 010040 | /020027 |
| 010042 | /000300 |
| 010044 | /100003 |
| 010046 | /012703 |
| 010050 | /000003 |
| 010052 | /000410 |
| 010054 | /020027 |
| 010056 | 7000320 |
| 010060 | /100093 |
| 010062 | /012703 |
| 010064 | 2000005 |
| 013065 | 2000402 |
| 010070 | 2012203 |
| 010072 | 2000007 |
| 013074 | 7005202 |
| 010076 | /105737 |
| 019100 | 7177564 |
| 013102 | /100375 |
| 010104 | /110037 |
| 010106 | 7177566 |
| 010110 | /005001 |
| 019112 | /005037 |
| 010114 | 7177560 |
| 013115 | /105727 |
| 010120 | 7177560 |

------

ł

# SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM. ... CONTINUATION

#17 1

C. S. V

\*\*\* ++-+##4.KC

| 010122   | /100375  |
|----------|----------|
| A1 A1 24 | 2813281  |
| 010121   | /177562  |
| 010120   | 7400704  |
| 010130   | /122/01  |
| 010132   | 7000215  |
| 010134   | 7001034  |
| 010136   | /185737  |
| 010140   | /177564  |
| 010142   | /100375  |
| 010144   | /110137  |
| 010146   | /177566  |
| 010150   | 2812782  |
| 010100   | 2000012  |
| 010152   | 7000012  |
| 010104   | 100101   |
| 010156   | /1//364  |
| 010160   | /1003/5  |
| 010162   | /112737  |
| 010164   | 7000200  |
| 010166   | /177566  |
| 010170   | /077207  |
| 010172   | /105737  |
| 010174   | /177564  |
| 010176   | 2188375  |
| 010200   | 2442777  |
| 010200   | 1226121  |
| 010202   | 7000212  |
| 010204   | /1//366  |
| 010206   | 7105737  |
| 010210   | /177564  |
| 010212   | /190375  |
| 010214   | /112737  |
| 010216   | 7000212  |
| 010220   | /177566  |
| 910222   | 7000137  |
| 010224   | 2001172  |
| 010226   | 2922703  |
| 010270   | 2000004  |
| 010272   | 2100455  |
| 0100024  | 200700   |
| 010000   | 10000000 |
| 010235   | 1000002  |
| 010240   | /100425  |
| 010242   | /020127  |
| 010244   | 2000260  |
| 010246   | /100000  |
| 010250   | ./012704 |
| 910252   | /000260  |

•

#### SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM. .. CONTINUATION

010254 /000520 010256 /020127 010260 /000300 010262 /100003 010264 /012704 010266 /000260 010270 /000512 010272 /020127 010274 /000320 010276 .'100003 010300 /012704 010302 /000260 010304 /000504 010306 /012704 010310 /000260 010312 /000501 010314 /020127 010315 /000260 010320 /100003 010322 /012704 010324 /000240 010326 /000473 010330 /020127 010032 /000300 010334 /100003 010336 /012704 010340 /000240 010342 /000465 010344 /020127 010346 /000320 010350 /100003 010352 /012704 010254 /000240 010356 /000457 010360 /012704 010352 /000240 010364 2000454 310366 /022703 010270 /000005 010372 /100425 010074 /020127 010376 /000260 010400 /100003 010402 /012704 010404 /000320

- autima -

| 010406           | /000443            |  |
|------------------|--------------------|--|
| 010410           | /020127            |  |
| 010412           | /000300            |  |
| 010414           | /100003            |  |
| 010416           | /012704            |  |
| 010420           | 7000320            |  |
| 919422           | /000435            |  |
| 010424           | /02012/            |  |
| 010420           | 7000320            |  |
| 010430           | 7100003            |  |
| 010432<br>010434 | /8812104           |  |
| 01043            | /000427            |  |
| 010446           | /012704            |  |
| 010442           | /000320            |  |
| 019444           | /000424            |  |
| 010446           | 7020127            |  |
| 010450           | /000260            |  |
| 010452           | /100003            |  |
| 010454           | 7012704            |  |
| 918435           | 7000300            |  |
| 010460<br>810462 | 7000410            |  |
| 010464           | /02012.            |  |
| 010466           | /1000200           |  |
| 010470           | /012704            |  |
| 010472           | /000300            |  |
| 010474           | /000410            |  |
| 010476           | /020127            |  |
| 010500           | /000320            |  |
| 010502           | /100003            |  |
| 010504           | /012704            |  |
| 010506           | /000200            |  |
| 010510           | 7000402            |  |
| 010012           | /012/04<br>/000700 |  |
| 010314           | 7000500            |  |
| 010520           | 2074401            |  |
| 010522           | /105737            |  |
| 010524           | /177564            |  |
| 010526           | /100373            |  |
| 010530           | /110137            |  |
| 010522           | /177566            |  |
| 010534           | /005202            |  |
| 010526           | 7020227            |  |

an Siar a fra Mar un a

SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM... CONTINUATION
#### SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM..., CONTINUATION

010549 /000050 010542 /001036 010544 /005002 010546 /105737 010550 /177564 010552 /100375 010554 /11273? 010556 /000215 010560 /177566 010562 /012702 010564 /000012 010566 /105737 010570 /177564 010572 /100375 · 010574 /112737 010576 /000200 010600 /177566 010602 /077207 010604 /105737 010606 /177564 010610 /100375 010612 /112737 019614 /000212 010616 /177566 010620 /105737 010622 /177564 010624 /100375 010625 /112737 010630 /000212 010632 /177566 010634 /005002 010635 /005004 010640 /000167 010642 /177244

# APPENDIX B. - PROGRAM TO COUNT THE NUMBER Of occurrences of Erch Character in a message Stored at location 40000 and UP

and the second se

| 013000 | /912794 |
|--------|---------|
| 013002 | /117788 |
| 013004 | /012702 |
| 013006 | /000240 |
| 013010 | /005003 |
| 013012 | /012701 |
| 013014 | 2040000 |
| 013016 | /021127 |
| 013028 | /000215 |
| 013022 | 7001404 |
| 013024 | /022102 |
| 013026 | 7001373 |
| 013030 | /005203 |
| 013032 | 2000771 |
| 013034 | /000240 |
| 013036 | /000240 |
| 013040 | /000240 |
| 013042 | /105737 |
| 013044 | /177564 |
| 013046 | /100375 |
| 013050 | /110237 |
| 013052 | /177566 |
| 013054 | 2010324 |
| 013056 | /005202 |
| 013060 | /020227 |
| 013062 | 7800340 |
| 013064 | /001351 |
| 013066 | /000000 |

## APPENDIX C. - PROGRAM TO COMPUTE STATISTICS

#### OF MESSAGE

10 BLKDEF 80, 32, 1 20 BLKDEF B1, 32, 0 30 BLKDEF B2, 32, 0 40 BLKDEF 83, 32, 1 50 LET B3, 0, '@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[/]^\_' 60 BIBSET 80, 3, 11 65 BIBSET 80,1,15 66 BIBSET B3, 1, 15 70 LINK (110000), I1 150 FLORT B0, B1 155 MOVE B1, B2 160 INTG B1 170 LET R0, 81, 31 171 MOVE B2, B1 180 PRINT 'TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES= ', RØ 181 PRINT ' ' 190 PRINT 'CHAR NO. OF OCCURRENCES 200 FOR 12,0,31 219 LET R1, B1, I2 220 STACK 201,200,5,100,,4,254 240 LET 81, 12, R4 250 TRANS 0, 83, 12, 11 260 HOLOUT (KB1, I1, 1:1 270 LET R3, B1, I2 271 LET 13,80,12 280 PRINT ' 1,13 282 NEXT 12 285 PRINT / / 291 OSPEC (CR) 292 DISPLY B1/ M4, 4G4 293 OSPEC 1K81 300 LET R1.32. 310 MOVE 81,82 320 MUL B1, B1 330 INTG 82 340 LET R2, B2, 31 350 QUOT R2, R2, R1 360 PRINT (EXPECTED VALUE = 4, R2 380 PROD R2, R2, P2 390 INTG 81 400 LET R3, 81, 31 410 QUOT R3, R2, R1 420 DIF R3, R3, R2 420 PRINT (VARIANCE = 1,R3 450 STRCK 203,16,255 460 PRINT (STANDARD DEVIATION = ()85 470 RETURN END

#### APPENDIX D. - PROGRAM FOR THE

and the second second

DATA-KEYED CIPHER

010000 /012737 010002 /040002 010004 /001006 010006 /012737 010010 /000007 010012 /00+012 010014 /005037 010016 /037770 010020 /005000 010022 /005002 010024 /00503? 010026 /177560 010030 /105737 010032 /177560 010034 /100375 010036 /013700 010040 /177562 010042 /005003 010044 /020027 010046 /000260 010050 /100003 010052 /012703 010054 /000001 010056 /000416 010060 /020027 010062 /000300 010064 /100003 010066 /012703 010070 /000003 010072 /000410 010074 /020027 010076 /000320 010100 /100003 010102 /012703 010104 /000005 010106 /000402 010110 /012703 010112 /000007 010114 /005202 010116 /105737 010120 /177564

- -----

#### DATA-KEYED PROGRAM. .. CONTINUATION

Contraction of the

Mr. Mary Mary

Marine Marine

010122 /100375 010124 /110037 019126 /177566 010130 /010037 010132 /030000 010134 /010037 010136 /040000 010140 /012737 010142 /030002 010144 /001002 010146 /012737 010150 /040002 010152 /001004 010154 /005001 010156 /005037 010160 /177560 010162 /105737 010164 /177560 010166 /100375 010170 /013701 010172 /177562 010174 /013704 010176 /001002 010200 /010124 010202 /010437 010204 /001002 010206 /005004 010210 /022701 010212 /000215 010214 /001042 010216 /013704 010220 /001004 010222 /010114 010224 /105737 010226 /177564 010230 /100375 010232 /110137 010234 /177566 010236 /012702 010240 /000012 010242 /105737 010244 /177564 010246 /100375 010250 /112737 010252 /000200

## DATA-KEYED PROGRAM. .. CONTINUATION

------

010254 /177565 010256 /077207 010260 /105737 010262 /177564 010264 /100375 010266 /112737 010270 /000212 010272 /177566 010274 /105737 010276 /177564 010300 /100375 010302 /112737 010304 /000212 010306 /177566 010310 /000137 010312 /001172 010314 /000240 010316 2022703 010320 /000004 010322 /100455 010324 /022703 010326 /000002 010330 /100425 010332 /020127 010334 /000260 010336 /100003 010340 /012704 010342 /000260 010344 /000520 010346 /020127 010350 /000300 010352 /100003 010354 /012704 010356 /000260 010360 /000512 010362 /020127 010364 /000320 010366 /100003 010370 /012704 010372 /000260 010074 2000504 010375 /012704 010400 /000260 010402 /000501 010404 /020127

#### DATA-KEYED PROGRAM. .. CONTINUATION

010406 /000260 010410 /100003 010412 /012704 010414 /000240 010415 /000473 010420 /020127 . 010422 /000300 010424 /100003 019426 /012704 010430 /000240 010432 /000465 010434 /020127 010436 /000320 010440 /100003 010442 /012704 010444 /000240 010446 /000457 010450 /012704 010452 /000240 010454 /000454 010456 /022703 010460 /000006 010462 /100425 010464 /020127 010466 /000260 010470 /100003 010472 /012704 010474 /000320 010476 /000443 010500 /020127 010502 /000300 010504 /100003 010506 /012704 010510 /000320 010512 /000435 010514 /020127 010516 /000320 010520 /100003 010522 /012704 010524 /000320 010526 /000427 010530 /012704 010532 /000320 010534 /000424 010506 /020127

#### DATA\_KEYED PROGRAM... CONTINUATION

•

010540 /000260 010542 /100003 010544 /012704 010546 /000300 010550 /000416 010552 /020127 010554 /000300 010556 /100003 010560 /012704 010552 /000300 010564 /000410 010566 /020127 010570 /000320 010572 /100003 010574 /012704 010576 /000300 010600 /000402 010602 /012704 010604 /000300 010606 /074001 010610 /074401 010612 /023737 010614 /001012 010616 /037770 010620 /100024 010622 /013704 010524 /001006 010625 /012437 010630 /001014 010632 /010437 010634 /001006 010535 /012704 018540 /000084 010642 /106337 010644 /001014 010646 /077403 010650 /000241 010652 /012704 010654 /000005 010656 /106137 010660 /001014 010662 /077403 010664 /013704 010556 /001014 010670 /074401

\* - -

1

#### DATA-KEYED PROGRAM ... CONTINUATION

010E72 /005004 010574 /000240 018676 /000240 010700 /000240 010702 /105737 010704 /177564 010706 /100375 010710 /110137 010712 /177566 010714 /013704 010716 /001004 010720 /010124 010722 /010437 010724 /001004 010725 /005237 010730 /037770 010732 /005202 010734 /020227 010736 /000050 010740 /001036 010742 /005002 010744 /105737 010746 /177564 010750 /100375 010752 /112737 010754 /000215 010755 /177566 010760 /012702 010752 /000012 910764 /105737 010765 /177564 010770 /100375 010772 /112737 010774 /000200 010776 /177566 011000 /077207 011002 /105737 011004 /177564 011006 /100375 011010 /112737 011012 /000212 011014 /177566 011015 /105737 011020 /177564 011022 /100375

----

.

- ----

10,254+1.7

#### DATA-KEYED PROGRAM... CONTINUATION

meter States and

011024 /112737 011026 /000212 011030 /177566 011032 /005002 011034 /005004 011036 /000167 011040 /177112

.

..

-----

the state of the s

# RPPENDIX E. - ENCODING PROGRAM FOR

THE ( 15,4 ) CYCLIC CODE

| 014040 | /012700        |
|--------|----------------|
| 014042 | /051000        |
| 014044 | /080240        |
| 014046 | /000240        |
| 014050 | /013702        |
| 014052 | /050100        |
| 014054 | /112037        |
| 014056 | /050140        |
| 014060 | 7012703        |
| 014062 | /000002        |
| 014064 | 7012704        |
| 014066 | 7000004        |
| 014070 | 7012705        |
| 014072 | 7050200        |
| 014074 | /005037        |
| 014076 | /050142        |
| 014100 | /012501        |
| 014102 | 7106337        |
| 014104 | 2050140        |
| 014106 | /103002        |
| 014110 | 7074137        |
| 014112 | 2050142        |
| 014114 | 7000240        |
| 814116 | 7077410        |
| 014120 | /013737        |
| 014122 | /050142        |
| 014124 | /052000        |
| 014126 | /005237        |
| 014130 | /014124        |
| 014132 | /005237        |
| 014134 | /014124        |
| 014136 | <i>1077326</i> |
| 014140 | /077233        |
| 014142 | /012737        |
| 014144 | /052009        |
| 014146 | /020210        |
| 014150 | 2000137        |
| 011152 | 2004170        |

#### APPENDIX F. - NOISE GENERATING PROGRAM

۶

ł

٠.

014540 /012700 014542 /032000 014544 /012701 014546 /001000 014550 /005020 014552 /077102 014554 /000240 014556 /012700 014560 /057000 014562 /012746 014564 /012705 014566 /012746 014570 /000030 014572 /011667 014574 2000025 014576 /012704 014600 /177304 014602 /612714 014604 /010000 014606 /012637 014610 /177300 014612 /011467 014614 /000030 014615 /012701 014620 /177316 014622 /012703 014624 /000020 014626 /012624 014630 /012714 014632 /000401 014634 /014446 014636 /062716 014640 /000003 014642 /077307 014644 /005327 014646 /000000 014650 /001414 014652 2011614 014654 /005044 014656 /012711 014660 /177775 014662 /005724 014664 /042714 014666 /000001 014670 /060014

. . . . . .

-

## NOISE GENERATING PROGRAM. ... CONTINUATION

۰.

814672 /812774 014674 /000001 014676 /000000 814788 /888758 014702 /005026 014704 /012700 014706 /057000 014710 /012701 014712 /032000 014714 /012702 014716 /000177 014720 /012703 014722 /000020 014724 /006220 014726 /006011 014730 /077303 014732 /005721 014734 /012703 914736 /000095 014740 /006220 014742 /006011 014744 /077303 014746 /005721 814758 /877215 014752 /000137 014754 /001172

## APPENDIX G. - DECODING PROGRAM FOR-

THE MINIMUM DISTANCE DECODER

States and the states of the states

Sec. 3.

014154 /012700 014156 /052000 014160 /013737 014162 /050100 014154 /050102 014166 /063737 014170 /050100 014172 /050102 014174 /013701 014176 2050104 014200 /012703 014202 /054000 014204 2012704 014206 /000017 014210 /005037 014212 /050116 014214 /011005 014216 /074105 014220 /012702 014222 /000017 014224 /006305 014226 /005537 014230 /050116 014232 /077204 014234 2022737 014236 /000004 014240 /050116 014242 /002010 014244 /006301 014246 /103402 014250 /077421 014252 /000407 014254 /062701 014256 /000002 614260 /077425 014262 /000403 014264 /010123 014266 /005720 014270 /000403 014272 /012723 014274 2000000

8119

120

# DECODING PROGRAM...CONTINUATION

and the second second

2

| • •    |                                 |
|--------|---------------------------------|
| 814276 | /885728                         |
| 014300 | /162737                         |
| 014302 | 2000001                         |
| 014304 | /050102                         |
| 014306 | /003336                         |
| 014310 | 7000240                         |
| 014312 | /000240                         |
| 014314 | /000240                         |
| 014316 | /000240                         |
| 014320 | /013700                         |
| 014322 | 2050100                         |
| 014324 | /012701                         |
| 014326 | /054001                         |
| 014330 | /012702                         |
| 014332 | 2056000                         |
| 014334 | 7005003                         |
| 014336 | 7885884                         |
| 014340 | /112103                         |
| 014342 | 7003201                         |
| 014344 | 7112104                         |
| 014340 | 7003201                         |
| 014350 | 2000000                         |
| 014754 | 2000000                         |
| 014756 | 2106103                         |
| 014360 | 2077502                         |
| R14352 | 2012705                         |
| 014364 | 2000004                         |
| 014366 | /106203                         |
| 014370 | 2071392                         |
| 014372 | /012705                         |
| 014374 | 2000005                         |
| 014376 | /000241                         |
| 014400 | /106104                         |
| 014402 | /077502                         |
| 014404 | /012705                         |
| 014406 | /000064                         |
| 014410 | 2106304                         |
| 014412 | /077502                         |
| 014414 | /012705                         |
| 014416 | /000005                         |
| 014420 | /000241                         |
| 014422 | /105104                         |
| 014424 | 7077302                         |
| 014425 | 1014304                         |
| 014450 | -7110422<br>-70770/0            |
| 014452 | - 7 0 7 1 0 4 0<br>- 2000 4 5 7 |
| 014474 | -7000135<br>-7004470            |
| 074430 | . ( 0044164                     |

----

#### LIST OF REFERENCES

-----

- 1. Westing, A., Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum 1967.
- Savage, J.E., "Some Simple Self-Synchronizing Digital Data Scramblers," <u>Bell System Technical Journal</u>, Vol. 45, No. 2, February 1967.
- Leeper, D.G., "A Universal Digital Data Scrambler," <u>Bell System Technical Journal</u>, Vol. 52, No. 10, <u>December</u>, 1973.
- 4. Gitlin, R.D. and Hayes, J.F., "Timing Recovery and Scramblers in Data Transmission," <u>Bell System</u> <u>Technical Journal</u>, Vol. 54, No. 3, March 1975.
- 5. Mellen, G.E., "Cryptology, Computers and Common Sense," 1973 FJCC, AFIPS Conference.
- 6. Twigg, T., "Need To Keep Digital Data Secure?" <u>Electronic</u> Design, Vol. 23, No. 68, Pg. 68-76, 1972.
- Henricksson, V., "On A Scrambling Property of Feedback Shift Registers," <u>IEEE Transactions on Communications</u>, Vol. 20, No. 5, Pp. 998-1001, October 1972.

۲.

- 8. Golob, S.W., <u>Shift Register Sequences</u>, San Francisco: Holden-Day 1967.
- 9. Meyer, C.H. and Tochman, W.L., "Pseudorandom Codes Can Be Cracked," <u>Electronic Design</u>, Vol. 23, No. 74, Pp. 74-76, 1972.
- 10. Naval Research Laboratory Report 7900, "Cryptographic Digital Communications," by Torrieri, D.J., July 1975.
- 11. Geffe, P.R., "Secure Electronic Cryptography", Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Baltimore, Md., Pp. 181-187, 1972.
- 12. Altman, L., <u>Microprocessors</u>, Electronics Book Series, McGraw-Hill, 1975.
- 13. Kahn, D., The Codebreakers, Macmillan, New York, 1967.
- 14. Shannon, C.E. and Weaver, W., <u>The Mathematical Theory</u> of Communications, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1949.

- 15. Shannon, C.E., "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems," <u>Bell System Technical Journal</u>, 28,656, 1949.
- 16. Vernam, G.S., "Cipher Printing Telegraph Systems," Journal of the AIEF, Vol. XLV, February, 1926.
- 17. Sinkov, A., Elementary Cryptanalysis: A Mathematical Approach, Random House, New York, 1968.

たいち おうちょう うちょう たいちんしょう しょうちょう

and the second states where the second

18. Ash, Robert B., Information Theory.

2

- 19. S.G.S. Shiva, "Some Results on Binary Codes with Equivalent Words," IEEE Transaction on Information Theory, March 1969, Volume IT-15, Number 2.
- 20. Peterson, W. and Weldon, E.J. Jr., Error Correcting Codes.
- 21. Centinyilmaz, N., <u>Application of the Computer for Real</u> <u>Time Encoding and Decoding of Cyclic Block Codes</u>, <u>Master's Thesis</u>, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1975.